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THE NEMESIS OF CREATIVITY

Observations on our Occupation of Germany

BY ERNST ANSPACH

IN HIS *Study of History* Arnold Toynbee develops the concept of the nemesis of creativity. A civilization that has demonstrated creative spirit by meeting a given challenge with a successful response will not necessarily be equipped to come off equally well when it faces a new and different challenge as the result of its growth; and this not in spite of, but because of, its earlier success. The human tendency to mistake a contingent truth for an unconditional one expresses itself in an idolization of ephemeral values. Standards, methods, techniques, and concepts are continued beyond the limits of their applicability, with a resultant process of ossification which may lead to the breakdown of a civilization unless arrested in time.

Some of the difficulties we encounter in our intercourse with foreign nations may well be attributed to our proclivity toward a mistaken identification of new challenges with problems successfully conquered in our own national past. In the following pages I shall try to analyze some of our ideas, attitudes, and techniques on the basis of experiences gathered during the occupation of Germany, in an effort to determine the limits of their general applicability—limits that derive from the contingent nature of all human achievement. Perhaps the result can be a modest contribution toward finding an American response to challenges facing us outside the habitat to which we are accustomed, in the uncertainties of a future that is not necessarily a linear extension of the past.

I

Most of our historical experiences as a nation have taken place in an era in which there was such a concentration of human

energies on the economic aspects of life that it is hardly surprising that many people believe—thus concurring with the theorists of the classical school of economics, from Adam Smith to Jevons and Marx—that the only real challenge to humanity lies in the economic field. Similarly it is held that a sound economic process is not merely the best, but the only, way to achieve political and ethical ideals—and will automatically do so.

As convinced empiricists we have managed to keep our practices fairly well adjusted to changing conditions, but we usually live with theories, or residues thereof, which lag behind our practice. After all, early Americans were not economic theorists; the situation in which they found themselves demanded and rewarded empirical economics. Our theory of capitalism came into existence after the fact, perhaps at a time when the fact was no longer true, and continued independent of changing facts—as did, for example, our theories of unmodified free enterprise despite a general acceptance of trade unions, social legislation, and government aid to business.

In trying to explain to representatives of other nations, to Germany for instance, what we regard as desirable in the economic field, we have often had to revert to theory. And since the theoretical concepts employed in such explanations frequently lag behind our practice, we have encountered either of two consequences: either we have been taken at face value—German face value—and then misinterpreted as being archaists and reactionaries, thus giving aid and succor to German archaists and reactionaries, and alienating other groups whose practice might have been much closer to ours; or, because our practice has been, or has become, known, we have been considered hypocrites and our subsequent pronouncements doubted as probably insincere.

Contrariwise, we have accepted German styles, names, and labels to mean what they would mean in our own country. Thus we have believed that German capitalists have motives and policies quite similar to ours. After cooperating with them we have been shocked and dismayed to find that their ideas of labor relations

or the distribution of the national product are quite contrary to our own progressive ideas on the subject, and are likely to cause serious and dangerous social tension. When this has been pointed out, as for example in statements of seasoned American bankers like Bittenwieser and Cattier, the German entrepreneurs' reaction has been quite angry, and without any comprehension of what appears to them a change of mind on our part.

While our official occupation policy never favored any of the democratic parties over others, many officials engaged in the occupation of Germany naturally felt closer to Germans who were nominally of our economic conviction, and expressed this sentiment in individual contacts and decisions. In the faulty belief that like economic systems will of necessity create like social-political conditions, economic conservatism was often considered a safe indication of political reliability.

Thus not even the spiritual heirs of the Hugenberg-Schroeder-Papen clique were excluded from favor—a group that came to power through the brown National Socialist service entrance when it found the black-white-and-red monarchist front door permanently barred, thereby bringing death and suffering to millions of Europeans and thousands of Americans, and, lest we forget, enabled the Russians to reach the Elbe, which they would never have been able to do had not Europe been weakened by the madness of the Hitler whom these conservatives helped into office. Nor should it be assumed that the disappointments experienced during the Hitler era increased the political acumen of this group. Today there are dreams of playing a decisive part in world politics by cooperating with the "Russian hordes," just as there were once plans of playing along with the "Austrian paper-hanger" in the wishful but hubristic and faulty belief that traditional know-how will of necessity shape the course of dynamic events. Such reasoning, and not only an instinctless "business as usual" attitude, has contributed to the East-West trade in critical and strategic items and to the purchasing of advertising space in the West German communist press.

A belief in the determinant character of the economic system has led many Americans to distrust German socialists as "communists once removed," unmindful of the historic role of the Social Democratic party in compromising neither with fascism nor with communism. Many aims of this party have been realized in the progressive capitalism of our own country; and the evolutionary rather than revolutionary method to which the party subscribes makes for an ability to compromise, since socialist objectives are ideal and ultimate rather than practical and immediate. We have been inclined to overestimate the socialist, and underestimate the democratic, aspect of this and similar European groups—as exemplified by the temporary ban on sending German exchange students to Scandinavian countries since, in the opinion of an adviser in education matters, "American taxpayers' money is not to be spent to teach Germans socialism."

Another recent example of what appears as an undue regard for the economic aspects of life at the expense of other social considerations can be found in a decision of the HICOG United States Court of Appeals—since, fortunately, reversed. In this case (reported in the New York *Herald Tribune*, August 26, 1952) a young Yugoslav child had been abducted by SS troops in an action during which the child's father was killed, while his mother was captured and committed to a Nazi concentration camp. On her return to Yugoslavia after the war, the mother spent years in tracing the child, through the good services of the International Red Cross. She finally located her son in Germany, in the custody of a former SS soldier and his wife, and petitioned the court to return the child, furnishing evidence that she could provide him with a proper home. Her petition was denied by the United States court, on the grounds that "while Yugoslavia seems not as bad socially and democratically as most communist dictatorships . . . we think it compares economically unfavorably with free-enterprise Western Germany as a place to be brought up."

Insistence on full agreement in the economic sphere may de-

prive us of the cooperation of groups whose total approach to social and political problems would make them our natural allies. This proposition entails no abandonment of the capitalistic principle; only the concept that economics is the primary determinant of social relations should be relinquished. The extent to which capitalistic principles should be modified cannot be decided as a credo or a dogma, but only as a response to actual conditions. As a matter of fact, that is exactly what we have done in the United States. While there may be disagreement as to the appropriateness of various measures of the square, new, or fair deal, there are few persons in positions of influence or importance who would advise going back to the classical capitalism of a Ricardo. And it is no more revolutionary to be consistent, and to realize that other and further modifications of the capitalistic system are necessary in Europe because of the tightness of markets, the scarcity of materials, the density of population, and similar factors.

Before turning away from the subject of economics, it should be mentioned that further difficulties may be encountered where we are pressing for the adoption of successful American methods in a foreign habitat without analyzing and comparing all pertinent conditions. Thus while we were undoubtedly correct in criticizing the inequitable way in which the national product is distributed in Germany, and in pointing out the dangers of "hunger communism," we should hesitate to recommend an indiscriminate raising of wages as an economic panacea. If an upward adjustment of wages takes place when production capacity is not fully utilized, the higher demand for goods caused by the increase in purchasing power will result in increased production, better utilization of capacity, and therefore lower per unit costs—which may partly or fully absorb expenses for higher wages. But the results of raising wages are quite different where credit is restricted, markets limited, materials scarce, or production capacity fully utilized.

Similarly, our own experience in dealing with the problem of

cartels needs extensive reexamination before it can be adapted to the European scene—as we tried to do in our decartelization policy in Germany. Most Europeans would agree with Schumpeter, who considers the cartel not a corrupted, but the fully matured, form of capitalism. No doubt monopolies are a stranglehold on a growing economy where perfect or near perfect competition is still a possibility, but the cartel may well be the most practical form of organization in an economy or in economic fields already arrived at the static phase of full growth.

To summarize, overemphasis on the economic aspect of life has made it difficult for us to determine what individuals and groups in Germany—and in other foreign countries—are our natural friends and which are our natural enemies. And idolization of contingent experience in the economic field may deprive us of our greatest possible effectiveness in organizing the free world as a sphere of prosperity.

As a final word on this subject I should like to add that in the cold war between Russia and this country it is a mistake to accept as correct the formula—used by the Soviet Union—that USSR versus USA equals communism versus capitalism. Communism as a social and economic theory can be fought most effectively by demonstrating that in our national life we have found the synthesis in which the thesis of classical capitalism and the antithesis of classical communism are dissolved, by recognizing the instrumental character of economic activities. This would deprive the Soviet leadership of the last vestiges of their claim to being defenders of the rights of the underprivileged, and would show the conflict between them and us in its true character as a conflict of ideas on the nature of man.

II

If our own historical experiences have induced us to overestimate the importance of economic structure, they have on the other hand led us to give only limited consideration to a phenomenon that has for over a century had disastrous effects on

the fate of Europe, and is about to assume the same baneful role the world over: nationalism.

Our own experiences have been of a patriotic rather than a nationalistic character: pride in and loyalty to a common heritage and achievement, translated into a feeling of interdependence, mutual trust, and devotion to the common weal. Only concepts like "Manifest Destiny" and "God's own country" point in the direction of nationalism in its negative aspects; and certain recent definitions of what constitutes "un-American activities" come dangerously close to it. Such nationalism, in Arnold Toynbee's definition (*A Study of History*, vol. 1, p. 1), is "a spirit which makes people act, feel and think about a part of any given society as though it were the whole of that society." It is this latter aspect of nationalism that we encounter in Europe.

Disillusioned with religious ideals as the result of their corruption in the religious wars and in clerical abuse, and disappointed at the non-arrival of the rational millennium so confidently expected by the disciples of enlightenment, the masses of Europe tried to assuage their deep anxiety by turning to pseudo-religions, among them the idolization of the national community. The insufficiency of this creed, and its inability to overcome a feeling of personal meaninglessness by subordinating the insignificant individual to the all-powerful state, are clearly shown by the xenophobia which is always part and parcel of nationalism: only deep insecurity concerning the true value of the ideals so ardently avowed can breed the characteristic hatred of the stranger, whose mere existence seems to cast doubt on those ideals' validity. But the powers engendered by despair are not much weaker than those of hope; and by nationalism and intolerance Europe has endangered its very existence, has been torn apart in disastrous wars, and has maintained political subdivisions that are clearly anachronistic.

We have been more fortunate in the United States. Be it the result of the size, wealth, and geographic location of our country, be it because of our success in raising living standards or in main-

taining at least residues of our spiritual inheritance, our people, by and large, have known little of the personal insecurity of the European and his symbiotic urge to derive some feeling of assurance from subordinating his entire life to the national community, or from self-glorification by subduing the stranger.

But this good fortune has also made it difficult for us to understand the negative aspects of nationalism where we encounter them in our intercourse with foreign nations. For instance, in establishing categories of persons to be eliminated or punished under our denazification program in Germany, we treated National Socialism as a phenomenon *sui generis*, omitting from our consideration those other rabid forms of nationalism without which Hitler and his party could never have come to power. Only the first drafts of denazification directives gave any weight to activities in such nationalistic organizations as the *Deutsche Nationale Volkspartei* and the *Bayerische Volkspartei*. Subsequently only the National Socialist party and its subdivisions and formations were considered incriminating—but including those in which membership had little or no political significance.

We held National Socialism to be the disease, whereas proper historical analysis could have shown it to be merely a symptom of the real malady, nationalism in its negative aspects. We forgot that for some people the reason they had never entered the party was that they considered Hitler not sufficiently radical, or not sufficiently high-class; and many a man who actually was not an enemy of Hitler, but an unsuccessful competitor for his laurels, was left unscathed and was even, and is still, considered excellent material for the highest offices in the young German democracy.

Indeed, it is worth while to interpolate here a few remarks on another aspect of the failure of our denazification program. In this program we confused two aims which should have been pursued separately: the punishment of criminal elements; and the elimination of activists from positions of importance and influence. The former we should have left to ordinary courts, either Allied or German, applying accepted rules of law, rather than

to quasi-judicial bodies meting out punishment on the basis of *ex post facto* rules. The second aim should have been clearly designated as a measure of political precaution. Those responsible for the outrages of Nazism could and should have been eliminated as policymakers and teachers, with these terms used in the widest sense, and from positions where they could engage again in the kind of activities that had brought such misery to the world. This course is clearly not a function of retribution or justice; it is a function of political precaution, and as such it should have been subject to the one definite limitation of the art of politics, the practically possible. Our original denazification directives somehow realized this limitation, and were restrained in scope. But when public sentiment in the United States, in the summer of 1945, was aroused by the revelation of the full scope of Nazi atrocities, and the functions of justice and police began to be confused, we started something impossible, the denazification of the vast majority of the total population of Germany.

The net result of this policy was that multitudes of janitors and charwomen were punished with unemployment and fines for being small and spineless fellow travelers, while big-time activists lived off the fat accumulated before the lean years of the occupation, and finally returned to the limelight for unimpeded action, when the denazification process had overtly broken down. As a consequence, we see today a strengthening of nationalistic sentiment among the masses of the "small-fry" Nazis, who resent the disadvantages they suffered—considering them not just punishment but merely a manifestation of foreign vindictiveness—while many others, who had really made an active contribution to the rise and fortune of the National Socialist regime, have returned to key positions in government, teaching, and industry, without giving any evidence that they have mended their ways or that their influence in the future will be more salubrious than it has been in the past.

In German circles there has been some conscious or uncon-

scious realization that nationalism, not National Socialism, is the root of many of the present-day evils in the European sphere. For this reason there has been little understanding for the self-righteous attitude of the victor powers. German slogans to the effect that "you could have stopped Hitler before it was too late" must also be understood in this light, and not exclusively as political adolescence or attempts to compensate for guilt complexes.

The confusion that exists in our country concerning the spectre of "renazification" in Germany is directly connected with our mistaking National Socialism for the disease of which it is only a symptom. If renazification is taken to mean an exact repetition of what was attempted under the Hitler regime, it has not taken place, and will not take place. That system was discredited by its failure and collapse in 1945, which were of such magnitude that they cannot be explained away by any revival of the *Dolchstoßlegende*—the myth of the "stab in the back," of post World War I fame. But extreme nationalism remains as a source of danger. Statistics on the number of former Nazis in key positions do not make pretty reading, but even these statistics are misleading because some ex-Nazis have mended their ways while, on the other hand, chauvinism is unfortunately not limited to former members of the NSDAP. There are still too many Germans who have forgotten Stalingrad and Falaise, and in whose minds the East is inhabited by subhumans, the West is in disintegration, and the United States is in an awful spot, and fully dependent on German goodwill. In this connection it is necessary to note the deplorable trend toward nationalism in wide circles not only of the former liberals but also of the Social Democratic party.

The danger of a revival of German nationalism has a telling effect on our relations with the countries of Eastern Europe. Rather than being satisfied with a static concept of containment, we should realize that it is fear of German nationalism more than anything else that keeps satellite states like Poland or Czechoslovakia in the Soviet fold. No matter how we try to convince

these states of the advantages of our way of life, no matter how disgusted they may be with their existence under Russian domination and disappointed about broken Soviet promises, there is still a belief, cleverly nourished by Soviet propaganda, that the Soviet army is the shield against German desires for retribution and the traditional *Drang nach Osten*. An integrated Europe without nationalistic tendencies would naturally attract these satellite countries; a Europe with a militant nationalistic Germany striving for hegemony would be, even in their present predicament, more of a threat than a promise.

There is, of course, a school of thought that will consider all these arguments theoretical and vain, because it holds that war is unavoidable. Those of this persuasion may hold no brief for Hitler and his general staff—although some of them are convinced by now that Hitler was not so bad after all, because of his anti-communism, being unmindful of the fact that it was Hitler who, by unleashing the warhounds, weakened Europe to the point where Soviet designs became an actual threat. But such persons feel that the German nationalists have always been and probably will continue to be good soldiers, and that their being in on the fight will save American lives.

This calculation is patently wrong. True, there is less communist sentiment in Germany today than in most European countries. But if war comes, the decisions of a nationalistically motivated German general staff will not be dictated by a dislike for the Soviet Union or by a non-existent love for us; they will be dictated solely by military exigency and nationalistic interests as they appear to the generals from day to day—and though we would undoubtedly win the last, we would not necessarily win all the intermediate battles. This, from our point of view, makes a nationalistically spirited German army at best unreliable mercenaries—not to mention the fact that the German general staff may still overestimate the importance of manpower and underestimate the decisiveness of industrial production, thus being led to bet on the wrong horse, as it has done in the past.

Fortunately there is increasing evidence of a tendency toward Western European integration. Nationalism, however, will continue to plague the new federation, before and after its creation. There are groups, both in France and in Germany, that talk United Europe but actually mean a realization of their old hegemonic dreams and aspirations. The mutual distrust and the scheming of these groups will delay fusion unnecessarily, and may jeopardize the success of the union, once it is accomplished. Worse, there are nationalistic groups in France, Germany, and Italy—usually under ex-fascist leadership, with publications like *La Victoire*, *Nation Europa*, and *Nazione Europa*—whose vision of a United Europe is that of a continent united on the basis of supernationalism and opposed to both the West and the East. A European community with a spirit of European nationalism might simply split into three feuding parts a world that is none too pleasant as the battleground of two opposing views. This might bring us closer to Orwell's "1984" than to Willkie's "One World," or even than to a modern version of a Pax Romana. In any event, the phenomenon of nationalism unquestionably deserves more attention than our specific experiences in our own history incline us to give it.

In closing this section it should be mentioned that our virtual identification of patriotism and nationalism accounts for another difficulty we encountered in our occupation of Germany. We were unable to understand that anyone could have other than venal reasons for cooperating with us against the alleged or real national interests of his country. As citizens of a nation that has traditionally considered the best government the one that governs least, we are willing to give to Caesar what is Caesar's; and thus we find it difficult to comprehend that in a nation with a totalitarian development it is not in spite of patriotism, but because of it, that obedience must cease where sin begins.

Therefore, though we accepted the cooperation of former concentration-camp inmates, emigres, and resistance workers, we did not quite trust them or their motives, and did not understand

how they could at the same time be patriots and regard us as liberators. Often we let them feel our disdain, or dropped them as soon as they outlasted their immediate usefulness. The fact that people just released from concentration camps or out of hiding were more often than not shabbily dressed and not of cheerful disposition increased our initial poor impression and our prejudices. And on the other hand we often esteemed and accepted as our equals those well-dressed, refined, conservative gentlemen of heavy industry, the foreign office, or even the general staff who explained that they had never been Nazis but that as good Germans they had not, of course, opposed the national government or betrayed their nation's cause. Too often we remained oblivious of the fact that these gentlemen's brand of patriotism fattened on the lives, property, and happiness of their less fortunate compatriots.

III

The conditions of the frontier favored the man who was a jack of all trades. The successful colonist had to be, and managed to be, farmer, hunter, carpenter, soldier, merchant, teacher, and many other things. And even when the existence of well-integrated communities permitted specialization, the average American retained the desire for competence in more than one field. Great social mobility and adaptability are the advantages of this attitude; on the other hand, we often tend to underestimate the need for specialization in areas where it is unavoidable, and to make improper use of available specialists. These negative tendencies are reinforced by a corrupted version of the dogma of predestination: where earthly success is considered a safe indication of the favor of the deity, there is no reason to assume that one of the "elected" will fail in any of his temporal pursuits.

Our training program for occupational duty reflected an undervaluation of the complexities that even the members of the smallest detachments would have to face. There was some careful training at Charlottesville and in some so-called CAT schools throughout

the United States, but these schools provided only a fraction of the needed personnel. The majority of officers were taken from field outfits at the last minute, and were trained for their new duties in courses which, under the pressure of events, had finally to be reduced to two weeks' length. Needless to say, two weeks would not have sufficed even if teachers and students had been of the highest caliber; unfortunately it must be added that selection was not always ideal, not only in regard to native intelligence and previous training of the candidates, but also in regard to their pre-military social experience and responsibility, and therefore their ability to withstand the many temptations to abuse of power or even personal dishonesty that are inherent in occupational duty.

While there is no substitute for integrity and intelligence, a lack of specific experience, given time, will not weigh so heavily, since such experience, granting American ingenuity, can be acquired by practice. But where very narrow margins of safety mean that initial mistakes may be final, there is need for correct action from the beginning, and no time for study and experimentation. In the chaotic conditions that we encountered in the first months of our occupation of Germany, we had immediate need for experts, who were not available, and some of the ensuing losses were irreparable—among them the loss of goodwill, arising from the fact that the Germans usually overestimated our ability and were skeptical about the purity of our intentions.

When there arose some realization of the shortage of and the need for experts, all available persons with some previous experience in the German field, among them former exchange students and refugees, were used for the operation. But here again the importance of specialization was underestimated. Familiarity with the German language, or with some aspect of German life, does not make a man an expert on all its phases, from civil service, public safety, political parties, labor relations, and agriculture to school curricula, local government, public health, and industrial management. Nor did these appointed or self-appointed experts,

often of modest army rank, have always the good judgment or the courage to admit the limits of their knowledge. Some of them, to be sure, did very well—usually those who knew where to look for information; others believed they were, or acted, omniscient, and did not improve matters.

Even where specialists were available, they often lacked familiarity with local conditions. Technical knowledge is fairly easily applied in a different habitat; thus our engineers and agricultural experts did a magnificent job in establishing and maintaining means of communication or raising food production, even though their work had to be done in the most trying circumstances. It was more difficult for our economists, educators, lawyers, and administrators to supplement their general knowledge by familiarity with local traditions, institutions, resources, and potentialities, though without this they could not translate their general knowledge into practical and applicable terms. And soon an additional difficulty arose. It was impossible for most persons engaged in the occupation of Germany to make their activity a career; consequently they could not afford to stay away from their ordinary business or occupation for a protracted period, and throughout the occupation of Germany excellent and highly qualified people were lost because of their return to the States just when, or shortly after, they had acquired the necessary knowledge of local conditions to be fully effective.

The establishment of additional schools for the study of international relations, the civil affairs training program of the United States army, and the lateral transfer of specialists of proved quality into the Department of State justify the hope that in the future we shall not depend excessively on improvisation in situations where, in addition to intelligence and resourcefulness, positive and expert knowledge is required. Ultimately this and similar developments may even lead us to abandon another tendency closely connected with our idolization of the amateur and of mobility: our traditional preference of youth to experience.

A further aspect of our "myth of the amateur" is our inclination

to accept a specialist's view as the comprehensive analysis of a picture which in actuality is so complex as to defy description from only one specific point of view. The very simplicity of the analysis of the specialist, who treats all factors outside his own field as functions rather than variables, has a great deal of appeal; the part truth of such a partial analysis is always, however, also a part falsehood. The concept of economics as the determinant of social structure, which was discussed earlier, is an example of a specialist's world outlook. More recently there has been an undue regard for the efficacy of the military decision. Without underestimating the threat of war caused by the designs and capabilities of our adversaries, and without minimizing the enormous contribution that our military leaders have made and continue to make in protecting us, it can be said that those who preach that war is unavoidable—and therefore urge the rearmament of Germany without a most careful weighing of political and economic consequences, and without contemplating appropriate safeguards—seem to prefer facing the single horrible contingency of war to accepting the many complexities of maintaining peace.

To summarize, our tradition of versatility of talents has made us somewhat unmindful of the human intellect's proclivity to departmentalize its field of action, and sometimes of the need to do so; and on the opposite side of the coin, when we do accept the need for specialists we tend to accept their pronouncements as larger than they are. As a consequence we are prone either to overlook essential details or to arrive at faulty judgments and decisions by accepting elements of a situation as its totality.

IV

When ideas are translated into reality, forms and institutions grow around them. This often leads to an ossification, in which mechanical observation of rules and regulations formed in the application of the idea is substituted for adaptation to changing conditions. While some basic idea may characterize all or most

times and places, the forms it has assumed are always conditioned by a definite time and a specific place. Therefore an insistence on the accidental forms and institutions in which an idea has found its expression may render impossible or impractical its otherwise feasible adaptation to a habitat different from the one in which it was first translated into practice. By and large, our pragmatism and our vitality and dynamism have saved us from the ossification of orthodoxy; still, we occasionally mistake form for content.

If, in talking to a fellow citizen, we substitute form for an underlying idea, the chances are good that we are understood correctly; as a matter of fact, this manner of communication serves as a kind of conversational shorthand, one or a few words describing adequately what otherwise would take considerable explanation. But when we address ourselves to representatives of foreign nations or civilizations, a nominal identity of concept may hide a vast difference in actual meaning, and complete misunderstanding may ensue. An example that comes to mind is the lecture of a visiting American sociologist in Germany, who, in addressing a gathering of social scientists, stated that the simple way to be a good democrat is to be a good father. But he failed to clarify his terms of reference, and what is undoubtedly true of the particularist type of family, with wife and children enjoying the full benefits of emancipation, meant quite the contrary to his audience, for whom the terms father and family man were related to the patriarchal type of organization which is still the prototype of the family in Germany. Similar mistakes have caused much confusion concerning American institutions, and have hampered our reorientation effort. Incidentally, it may well be that visiting experts' surprise at the necessity of defining terms of reference familiar to most people in the United States, without a concurrent realization of their own ignorance of foreign forms and institutions, has been the cause of their not infrequent and strongly resented habit of "talking down" to their German counterparts.

Another aspect of this intercultural misunderstanding is that

we may feel inclined to consider a foreign institution acceptable because we interpret it, though mistakenly, as identical with one of our own. Thus there was a time when many Americans felt that an armed contingent of volunteers in Germany would be less objectionable than reintroduction of a draft system or of universal military training. In our own history a volunteer army has always meant a relatively small and politically insignificant military establishment under unchallenged civilian control. In Germany, however—where those elements that are politically trustworthy remember experiences gathered under the Kaiser and Hitler and are still not very keen on bearing arms, while hundreds of thousands of ex-professional soldiers of strong nationalistic sentiment have not been fully absorbed in the national economy, or compare the dullness of their present civilian pursuits with the excitement and glory of their military service—there a volunteer army would simply legalize the notorious Free Corps of the period after World War I, an organization that successfully undermined the Weimar republic. The risks inherent in German rearmament cannot be eliminated by calling volunteers, but only by finding a broad popular basis and a civilian defense concept.

The identification of idea and form leads to an illusion, reminiscent of sympathetic magic, that since ideas or basic attitudes have assumed a certain form under certain conditions, adoption of the same form will of necessity, and even in different circumstances, create the same ideas or basic attitudes. There is, of course, more than linear causation between substance and form: ideas grow into institutions and are in turn modified and influenced by institutions—but modified and influenced, not created.

Nevertheless, on the basis of this illusion, we rushed the adoption of constitutions in Germany, and hurried people to the polls. It was somewhat unrealistic to assume that more than a decade of Nazi propaganda and political suppression, and the horrors of a lost war, had increased interest in or knowledge of political matters, or that millions of people with never-ending worries about shelter, food, fuel, and clothing would pay much attention

to the finer points of political philosophy. So, though our achievement reports hailed great democratic progress, the political apathy of the great masses brought many discredited parties and politicians back on the political stage, and the German federal and state constitutions will inspire few Germans to lay down their lives in their defense—even apart from the fact that many of the constitutions were written so loosely, in the haste of finishing the job, that if their provisions should ever be contested there would be ample work for the otherwise overcrowded legal profession in Germany.

In our reorientation effort we often weakened our stand by excessive confidence in the efficacy of institutions and techniques. This holds true not only of extreme suggestions—like that of a specialist who recommended replacement of German statutory law with our common law as the panacea that would solve all problems encountered in Germany—but of reforms in which American institutions or techniques should have been modified to be fully adaptable to the German scene. Thus our system of eight years of primary schooling was not appreciated as a broadening of the educational basis, for we failed to show how the standards of Germany's traditional secondary education could be preserved; and such popular changes as civil service reform and a policy of freedom of trade could be defeated by the vested interests in Germany, which managed to delay enactment of these reforms beyond the time when we had the powers of enforcement, by pointing out those details that did not quite correspond to German conditions.

Our Cultural Affairs Division in Germany always had an oversupply of technicians and a shortage of scholars. Of course there is much in German pedagogics that needs reform, but where our powers of command ceased and we had to convince people of the soundness of our approach, the specialist was not an ideal instrument. The specialist who teaches how to teach history without really being a historian is by European standards at best an oddity, and fails to command respect. Identifying the vehicle

with what it was meant to convey, we found ourselves short of educators and overly blessed with "educationists," as one American scholar used to call them. We spent much time and money on discussion techniques, get-acquainted games, and even folk dancing, which the students had learned quite adequately in the Hitler Youth; during the 1952 budget year the monetary allocation for a student employment program was higher than for the total of all political reorientation projects.

Confidence in the form as guarantee of the content is shown also by our overvaluation of legal instruments in international relations. Either a nation has the power to enforce compliance with its wishes or—except for righteous indignation—it is not much better off for its ability to say reprovingly "*pacta sunt servanda*." German constitutional lawyers could not quite understand our psychology when we went into lengthy negotiations about the occupation statute, instead of simply announcing what occupational powers we would waive, conditionally or fully. They learned, however, that we were willing to pay for things that we could have had for nothing, or almost nothing, and they were quick to take advantage of this peculiar proclivity of ours when the negotiations began for the Schumann Plan, the European Defense Plan, and the contractual agreement to replace the occupation statute. This is not meant to question the value of these agreements. It is necessary, however, to inquire into underlying wills, aspirations, and powers and into the possibility of enforcement, not only in order to limit price to value but also to prevent such agreements from becoming a mental Maginot line, once they are concluded.

v

Our way of thinking and acting has been almost exclusively influenced by the empirical sciences. Consequently the existence of theoretical components of cognition is denied or depreciated: everything real is experience, and our methodological approach is by trial and error. Continental European thinking, on the

other hand, has been predominantly influenced by mathematics, with a resultant preference for metaphysics and for comprehensive systems defined previous to, and often not subject to, subsequent experience. Our empiricists have stressed and raised the importance of the individual; the metaphysicists have been inclined to relate the individual's fate to collective entities of which it is considered an organic part. These differences of approach and methodology have often placed formidable obstacles in the path of mutual understanding and cooperation.

In trying to reach agreements with German authorities on badly needed legislation, a complicated law might be held up for a long time because the Germans wanted us to reconsider what we held to be an insignificant detail or a most remote contingency. It was almost impossible to convince Germans of the advisability of having something to work with immediately, and of making changes subsequently on the basis of experience rather than delaying action indefinitely; often, as in currency reform, we had to take the initiative and responsibility ourselves. Sometimes negotiations broke down completely because the Americans were convinced that the Germans used sham arguments in a purely obstructionist course, whereas actually it was only the systematic approach of the German mind that prevented a realization of the benefits of improvisation and ad hoc action. And contrariwise, whenever any measure on which we had insisted, on a trial-and-error basis, happened to fail fully or partially, the Germans were quite convinced that we had figured everything in advance, including losses, as they might have done in our position, and that the disagreeable consequences were the result not of honest errors but of a comprehensive, systematic design to hurt and damage them.

It should be added that the trial-and-error method must be used cautiously where margins of safety are narrow or non-existent; we are undoubtedly spoiled by the great wealth of our resources, and do not realize how often we have succeeded in spite of, and not because of, wastefulness. Also, a lack of overall planning is

frequently the cause of inconsistency of thought and action in regard to the different parts of an arbitrarily and artificially divided whole, and incompatibility of purpose may vitiate success of action in various fields. It was difficult, if not impossible, to engage at the same time in plant removal and economic rehabilitation, in penalizing even nominal membership in a political party and educating for a more active participation in political life, in democratization and remilitarization.

The difference between the empiricist and metaphysical approaches also makes for their respective timings of theory and practice. In the United States, today's practice is tomorrow's theory; in Germany, today's theory is tomorrow's practice. Our reorientation effort often compared theory with theory, and practice with practice; thus we compared our past with Germany's present, and our present with Germany's future, and failed to give a clear picture of what was historic, what actual, and what potential. For this reason our most successful reorientation ventures were those where we managed to give a total picture of what the actual practice of American life amounts to, as by posting resident officers who were typical Americans with typical American families, in all counties of our zone, and by the granting of exchange scholarships.

It is to be hoped that the antithetical approaches of empiricism and metaphysics will ultimately be dissolved in the synthesis of an approach which incorporates all the merits, and eliminates the faults, of both ways of reasoning. Until such time, however, we should not permit an idolization of our traditional philosophical pattern to prevent us from understanding the thought processes of other groups and from realizing and making known the intellectual premises of our reasoning.

VI

The ramifications of the scientific discoveries that started with Galileo and Newton, and man's increasing ability to dominate and modify his physical environment, have led him to deny the ex-

istence of facts outside of potential human control. This is what Jaspers calls *Wissenschaftsaber Glaube*—superstitious overvaluation of science. It is now breaking down, not only because in many countries the coming of the material millennium has been delayed beyond the willingness of the faithful to wait, but also because where people got close enough to the promised land to appraise its merits, it was found somewhat wanting in milk and honey. The modern natural sciences, among them the physics of quantum and relativity, do not support the optimism of the mechanical age: while they increase the scope of the rationally knowable in the phenomenological world, they also clearly point out the ideal limits of the knowable, and thus also the possibility of truths that can be neither proved nor disproved by rational processes.

Unfortunately, however, the masses are extremists. Instead of moderating their inflated esteem for science, they abandon it altogether, moving from superstitious overconfidence in the efficacy of rational thought directly into disdain for the rational as a source of any, even limited, truth—Jaspers' *Wissenschaftsverachtung*. Either attitude is an aberration, with *Wissenschaftsaber Glaube* prevalent in countries like the United States, which have so far been successful in maintaining control over the physical environment (though the growing anti-intellectualism in this country may be a danger signal), and *Wissenschaftsverachtung* rampant wherever, as in Germany and Russia, such control has failed or collapsed.

Many of our educators were deeply upset when they noted that our well-meant and often well-planned reorientation efforts failed to inspire in the youth of Western Germany the enthusiasm that was characteristic of the Nazi organization and also of some of the Soviet-inspired youth movements in the Russian zone of occupation. At times we even encouraged some minor Hitler Youth successors in the West—fortunately only in a half-hearted manner, having misgivings as to whether one can drive out Satan with Beelzebub. We have not quite understood the pseudo-

religious content of National Socialism, without which it could not have succeeded. And we seldom realize that communism's strength lies not only in its criticism of existing economic conditions but also in its pseudo-spiritual promise of an earthly paradise, a beguiling promise wherever the chiliastic elements of Christianity have been excessively weakened.

It should be mentioned, too, that in our preoccupation with matters non-spiritual we have failed to note as one of the more encouraging signs in the German picture the growing social consciousness of the Protestant church. In postwar Germany, Protestantism is moving away from its orthodox concept of total corruption, and from the attendant indifference to matters temporal, which in Tawney's words had "emptied religion of its social content and society of its soul."

Man does not live by bread alone. Where the term God is eliminated, some shibboleth is adopted instead. The leader, blood and soil, the all-powerful state, the party that is never wrong replace the deity; the workers' paradise, the *Tausendjährige Reich* substitute for a spiritual millennium; and "progress" and "necessity" supersede "destiny."

We shall not find a way to the hearts and minds of other peoples simply by trying to convince them of the reasonableness of our approach; nor should we try to compete with the different intoxicants they have lived on, like chauvinism, fascism, and communism. Only true faith can exorcise the superstitions that fill a spiritual void. In our pride in our material accomplishments, which have been our outstanding contribution to world history during the last century, we should not forget our indebtedness to and our dependence on faith, which is one of the foundations of our civilization.

VII

Before trying to determine what lessons can be derived from the foregoing observations, it may be useful to state what conclusions they do not support.

No criticism of the personnel engaged in the occupation of Germany has been intended. The officials of military government, and subsequently the High Commission, represented a fair cross-section of the character, intelligence, ability, and education of our domestic population; most officials realized the importance of their responsibilities, and tried to make, even succeeded in making, the best of a difficult situation. Nor could all the adversities we encountered have been anticipated in the training and planning phase: our previous experience in military government, up to and including World War I, did not suffice as preparation for an operation in which the goal of organizing and controlling the occupied area in such a way as not to interfere with the military objective had to be secondary to the goal of establishing and maintaining the principles fought for.

The difficulties encountered in our occupation of Germany—and in foreign relations in general, which differ more in intensity than in nature from those under military government or post-liminary occupation—do not justify a spirit of resignation which expresses itself either in isolationism or in reliance on “enlightened self-interest.” The former is an impossibility: the very success of our way of life has carried us to a point where we must face new and greater challenges, must fail or succeed on a global scale. The latter tries to escape the difficulties of comprehending the specific views of other nations as developed on the basis of their specific historical experience, and to effect this escape by taking refuge in a belief in an inherent harmony of human endeavors; that belief, typical of eighteenth-century thought, is not supported by what Christianity, psychology, or historical experience teaches us about the nature of man.

Least of all is there any indication that the American way of life does not contain the elements of a successful response to the new and enormous challenge of being a world power. The concept of nemesis of creativity, as Toynbee develops it, has nothing of the necessity and finality of Spengler’s quasi-biological view of the unavoidable decline of civilizations. It merely emphasizes

the tendency to regard contingent truths as of eternal validity, and shows the dangers of so doing.

In the foregoing pages I have tried to describe the contingent nature of some of our dominant concepts. But what are the elements of our American experience that are not limited, in their applicability, to the specific conditions of the habitat in which they were developed?

We have translated into reality a new concept of the importance and dignity of man. In doing so we have freed vast energies from the bonds of inertia and defeatism, thus not only contributing immeasurably to the material comfort of mankind, but laying the foundation for making available to ever-increasing numbers of people the means of education and the leisure to pursue non-material objectives. Possibly we should guard against what Bertrand Russell, in his criticism of the Italian pragmatist Papini, calls "cosmic impiety"—a failure to realize factors outside human control, and a resultant intoxication with power, which vastly increases the danger of social disaster. With this limitation, however, the concept of the dignity and the creative powers of man justifies missionary zeal—and constant attention even in our own country, for its success during our national history does not ensure us a perpetual immunity from rising anxiety or from a loss of confidence in the individual ability to cope with the complexities of a chaotic world.

Our history also reflects a sense of responsibility to a community wider than the individual's immediate family or interest group. This voluntary limitation of self-interest, and the attendant understanding of human relationships and interdependence, form a solid basis for a democratic system of social justice.

Another historical pattern is our traditional distrust of power. Throughout our history—from the sermons of the early New England congregation, through the safeguards contained in our constitution, to present-day political thought—there has been no illusion about one proclivity of human nature: the tendency to use and abuse power. "Power corrupts, absolute power corrupts

absolutely" is a principle based on the nature of man, and not only on the contingencies of history.

Then we have our tradition of tolerance. An ability to respect another person's attitude, opinion, or action without accepting it or changing one's own has been instrumental in whatever social harmony we have achieved. This ability could serve as basis for peaceful adjustment on a wider than national basis.

Finally, we have, and always have had, faith in the ultimate meaning of our endeavors, our difficulties, and even our suffering.

The concept of the dignity and creativeness of the individual, a feeling of responsibility to the community, distrust of power, a tradition of tolerance and of faith are some of the elements of our historical experience, the proved value of which does not appear limited to the contingencies of our national past. With proper understanding of the social, political, and economic structures of other nations—which can be acquired—these principles could be translated into the terms of our international responsibilities.

GNOSTICISM AND MODERN NIHILISM

BY HANS JONAS

I

N IETZSCHE, in his time, said that nihilism, "the most uncanny of all guests," "stands before the door."¹ Meanwhile the guest has entered and is no longer a guest, and, as far as philosophy is concerned, existentialism is trying to live with him. Living in such company is living in a crisis. The beginnings of the crisis reach back into the seventeenth century, where the spiritual situation of modern man takes shape.

Among the features determining this situation, the one that Pascal faced in all its awful implications and expounded with the full force of his eloquence is man's loneliness in the physical universe of modern science. "Cast into the infinite immensity of spaces of which I am ignorant, and which know me not, I am frightened." "Which know me not": more than the overawing infinity of the silent spaces and of limitless cosmic time, more than the quantitative disproportion, the insignificance of man as a magnitude in this vastness, more than these it is the utter indifference of the Copernican universe to human aspirations—the not-knowing of things human on the part of that within which all things human have preposterously to be enacted—which constitutes the utter loneliness of man in the sum of things.

As a part of this sum, man is only a reed, liable to be crushed at any moment by the forces of an immense and blind universe in which it is but a particular blind accident. As a thinking reed he is no part of the sum, not belonging to it, but radically different, incommensurable, for the *res extensa* does not think, and nature is nothing but *res extensa*—body, matter, external magni-

¹ *Der Wille zur Macht*, § 34.

tude. If she crushes him, she does so unthinkingly, while he, being crushed, is aware of being crushed. He alone thinks, not because of but in spite of his being part of nature. If he has no share in nature's grandeur, which has become a foreign spectacle, nature has none in his inner concerns. Thus that which makes man superior to all nature, his unique distinction, mind, no longer results in a higher integration of his being into the totality of being, but on the contrary marks the unbridgeable gulf between himself and the rest of existence. Estranged from the community of being in one whole, his consciousness only makes him a foreigner in the world, and in every act of true reflection tells of this stark foreignness.

This is the human condition. There is no longer the *cosmos* with whose immanent *logos* my own can feel kinship, no longer the order of the whole which gives meaning to man's part in it, and therefore to his place in it. That place appears now as a sheer and brute accident. "I am frightened and shocked," continues Pascal, "at being here rather than there; for there is no reason why here rather than there, why now rather than then." There had always been a reason before, so long as the world had been regarded as life's cosmic home. But Pascal speaks of "this remote corner of nature" in which man has to "regard himself as lost," of "the little cell in which he finds himself lodged, I mean the universe." The utter contingency of man's existence in the scheme deprives that scheme of any human sense as a possible frame of reference for man's understanding of himself.

But there is more to this situation than the mere mood of homelessness, forlornness, and dread. The indifference of nature also means that nature has no reference to ends. With the ejection of teleology from the system of natural causes, nature, herself purposeless, ceased to provide any sanction to possible human purposes. A universe without an intrinsic hierarchy of being, as the Copernican universe is, leaves values ontologically unsupported, and the self is thrown back entirely upon itself in its quest for meaning and value. Meaning is no longer found, but is

"given." Values are no longer beheld in the vision of objective reality, but are posited as feats of valuation. As functions of the will they are solely my own responsibility. Will replaces vision; temporality of the act ousts the eternity of the "good in itself." This is the Nietzschean phase of the situation in which European nihilism breaks the surface. Now man is alone with himself.

The world's a gate
To deserts stretching mute and chill.
Who once has lost
What thou hast lost stands nowhere still.

Thus spoke Nietzsche (in *Vereinsamt*)—closing the poem with the line, "Woe unto him who has no home!"

Pascal's universe, it is true, was still one created by God, and solitary man, bereft of all mundane props, could still stretch his heart out toward the transmundane God. But this God is essentially an unknown God, an *agnostos theos*, and is not discernible in the pattern of his creation. The universe does not reveal his purpose by its order of created things, or his goodness by their abundance, or his wisdom by their fitness, or his perfection by the beauty of the whole—but reveals solely his power, by its magnitude, its spatial and temporal immensity. And though the contingency of man, of his existing here and now, is still a contingency upon God's will, that will, which has cast me into just "this remote corner of nature," is inscrutable, and the "why?" of my existence is here just as unanswerable as atheistic existentialism makes it out to be. The *deus absconditus*, of whom nothing but will and power can be predicated, leaves behind as his legacy, upon leaving the scene, the *homo absconditus*, a concept of man characterized solely by will and power—the will for power, the will to will.²

The point that particularly matters for the purposes of the present discussion is that a change in the vision of nature, that is,

² The role of Pascal as the first modern existentialist, which I have here very roughly sketched as a starting point, has been more fully expounded by Karl Löwith in his article on "Man Between Infinities," in *Measure, A Critical Journal* (Chicago), vol. 1 (1950), from which also the quotations from Pascal have been borrowed.

of the cosmic environment of man, is at the bottom of that metaphysical situation which has given rise to modern existentialism and to its nihilistic implications. But if this is so, if the essence of existentialism is a certain dualism, an estrangement between man and the world, with the loss of the idea of a kindred *cosmos*—in short, an anthropological acosmism—then it is not necessarily modern physical science alone which can create such a condition. A cosmic nihilism as such, by whatever historical circumstances it may have been begotten, would be the condition in which some of the characteristic traits of existentialism might evolve. And the extent to which this is found to be actually the case would be a test for the relevance which we attribute to the described element in the existentialist position.

There is one situation, and one only that I know of in the history of Western man, where—on a level untouched by anything resembling modern scientific thought—that condition has been realized and lived out with all the vehemence of a cataclysmic event. That is the Gnostic movement, or the more radical ones among the various Gnostic movements and teachings, which the deeply agitated first three centuries of the Christian era proliferated in the Hellenistic parts of the Roman empire and beyond its eastern boundaries. From them, therefore, we may hope to learn something for an understanding of that disturbing subject, nihilism, and I wish to put the evidence before the reader as far as this can be done in the space of a brief essay.

II

The existence of an affinity or analogy across the ages, such as is here alleged, is not so surprising if we remember that in more than one respect the cultural situation in the Greco-Roman world of the first Christian centuries shows broad parallels with the modern situation. Spengler went so far as to declare the two ages "contemporaneous," in the sense of being identical phases in the life cycle of their respective cultures. In this analogical sense we would now be living in the period of the early Caesars. However

that may be, there is certainly more than mere coincidence in the fact that we recognize ourselves in so many facets of later post-classical antiquity. Gnosticism is one of those facets, and here recognition, difficult as it is rendered by the strangeness of the symbols, comes with the shock of the unexpected, because it fits neither the picture of an age which a superficial historical consciousness characterizes mostly by Stoicism and Epicureanism, nor the picture of modern nihilism as—in line with the Nietzschean definition—essentially a post-Christian phenomenon.

In the following discussion I refer to existentialism as more or less a known quantity. Unfortunately I cannot do the same with Gnosticism. It lies off the main road of historical knowledge, and philosophers do not usually come across it. I am therefore compelled to dwell much more on the Gnostic side of my subject than a just balance in the comparison would warrant. In the circumstances, however, I do not see how this lopsidedness in my presentation can be avoided.

The term Gnostic refers to a group of religious doctrines at the beginning of our era which either explicitly identified themselves by the word *gnosis* or implied it as a central point of their message.³ *Gnosis* means knowledge, and the historical connotations of the term have caused many observers, ancient and modern, to see in Gnosticism the inroad of Greek philosophy into Oriental religious thought. In content, manner, and aim, however, the "knowledge" of the Gnostics has little to do with rational thought, and the Hellenic associations of the name are more misleading than enlightening.

Also easily misleading is the fact that the majority of the recorded Gnostic sects appear within the still fluid boundaries of the early church, thus investing the very name, in the minds of observers, with the meaning of a Christian heresy, a mere epiphe-

³ What follows is a brief summary of certain basic features of Gnosticism. The full argument for the view presented here, which differs from the conventional one, may be found in my *Gnosis und spätantiker Geist*, vol. 1 (Göttingen 1934). Note also two articles of mine on this subject in *Theologische Zeitschrift* (Basel): vol. 4, no. 2 (1948), and vol. 5, no. 1 (1949).

nomenon to Christianity. Modern research, however, has shown the existence of non-Christian Gnostic religions as well, coincident with the rise of Christianity in the declining ancient world, and there is evidence even of pre-Christian Gnosticism. As a matter of fact, the Gnostic movement—such we must call it—was a comprehensive phenomenon in those critical centuries, feeding like Christianity on the impulses of a widely prevalent human situation, and therefore erupting in many places, many forms, and many languages.

The salient feature to be emphasized here is the radically dualistic mood which underlies the whole Gnostic attitude and unifies the widely diversified, more or less systematic expressions which that attitude gave itself in Gnostic ritual and literature. It is on this primary human foundation of a dualistic mood, a passionately felt experience of man, that the formulated dualistic doctrines rest. The dualism is between man and the world, and concurrently between the world and God. It is a duality not of supplementary but of contrary terms, a polarity of incompatibles, and this fact dominates Gnostic eschatology. Basic to it is the feeling of an absolute rift between man and that in which he finds himself lodged: the world. The feeling is explicated in terms of doctrine. In its theological aspect it states that the Divine has no part and no concern in the physical universe; that the true God, strictly transmundane, is not revealed or even indicated by the world, and is therefore the Unknown, the totally Other, unknowable in terms of any worldly analogies. Correspondingly, in its cosmological aspect it states that the world is the creation not of God but of some inferior principle; and, in its anthropological aspect, that man's inner self—called the *pneuma*—is not part of the world, of nature's creation and domain, but, within that world, is as totally transcendent and as unknown by all worldly categories as is its transmundane counterpart, the unknown God without.

That the world is created by someone is generally not doubted in the mythological systems (though in some of the subtler systems a sort of dark autogenesis from orts of divinity is contemplated).

But whoever has created the world, man, according to Gnosticism, does not owe him allegiance; and neither his creation, though incomprehensibly encompassing man, nor his proclaimed will offers the standards by which man can set his course. Since the true God cannot be the creator of that to which selfhood feels so utterly a stranger, nature must have been created by a lowly demiurge, a power far removed from the supreme source of Being, a perversion of the Divine, retaining of it only the power to act, but to act blindly, without knowledge; he created the world out of ignorance and passion.

Thus the world is the product, and even essentially the embodiment, of the negative of knowledge. What it reveals is unenlightened and therefore malignant force, proceeding from the spirit of self-assertive power, from the will to rule and coerce—which, as spiritual, is foolish and bears no relation to understanding and love. The laws of the universe are the laws of this rule, and not of divine wisdom. Thus the essence of the *cosmos* is ignorance (*agnosia*). In this negativity the idea of knowledge (*gnosis*) finds its first application, an application in the privative mood. The positive complement is in the fact that the essence of man is knowledge: this determines the situation of man as that of the knowing in the midst of the unknowing, of light in the midst of darkness, and this relation is at the bottom of his being alien, without companionship in the dark vastness of the universe.

That universe has none of the venerability of the Greek *cosmos*. Contemptuous epithets are applied to it: "these miserable elements" (*paupertina haec elementa*), "this puny cell of the creator" (*haec cellula creatoris*)—both quotations from Marcion, the second offering literally the same expression that we found in Pascal. Yet it is still *cosmos*, an order—but order with a vengeance. Not only is the name *cosmos* retained for the world; it is called that now with a new and fearful emphasis, an emphasis at once awed and disrespectful, troubled and rebellious, for that order is alien to man's aspirations. The blemish of nature lies not in any deficiency of order, but in the all too pervading completeness of it.

Far from being chaos, the creation of the demiurge, that antitype of knowing, is a comprehensive system, governed by law. But cosmic law, once regarded as the expression of a reason with which man's reason can communicate in the act of cognition, is now seen only in its aspect of compulsion which thwarts man's freedom. The cosmic *logos* of the Stoics is replaced by *heimarmene*, oppressive cosmic fate.

This *heimarmene* is dispensed by the planets, or the stars in general, the mythical exponents of the inexorable and hostile law of the universe. The change in the emotional content of the term *cosmos* is nowhere better symbolized than in this depreciation of the formerly most divine part of the visible world, the celestial spheres. The starry sky—which from Plato to the Stoics was the purest embodiment of reason in the cosmic hierarchy, the paradigm of intelligibility and therefore of the divine nature of reality as such—now stared man in the face with the fixed glare of alien power and necessity. Its rule is tyranny, and not providence. Deprived of the venerability with which all sideric piety up to then had invested it, but still in possession of the prominent and representative position it had acquired, this stellar firmament becomes now the symbol of all that is terrifying to man in the towering factness of the universe. Under this pitiless sky, which no longer inspires worshipful confidence, man becomes conscious of his utter forlornness, of his being not so much a part of, but unaccountably placed in and exposed to, the enveloping system.

And, like Pascal, he is frightened. His solitary otherness, discovering itself in this forlornness, erupts in the feeling of elementary dread. Dread as a fundamental mood of being-in-the-world first became articulate not in existentialism but in the Gnostic writings. It is the self's reaction to the discovery of its situation, actually itself an element in that discovery: it marks the awakening of selfhood from the slumber or intoxication of the world; it is the way in which the inmost spirit becomes originally aware of itself and of the fact that it is not really its own, but is rather the involuntary executor of cosmic designs. Knowl-

edge, *gnosis*, might liberate man from this servitude; but since the *cosmos* is contrary to life, the saving knowledge cannot aim at the knower's integration into the cosmic whole, cannot aim at compliance with the laws of the universe, as did Stoic wisdom, which sought freedom in the knowing affirmation of universal necessity. For the Gnostics, contrary to the Stoics, man's alienation is not to be overcome, but is to be deepened and pushed to the extreme for the sake of the self's redemption.

III

Before going any further, let us stop to ask what has here happened to the old idea of the *cosmos* as a divinely ordered whole. Certainly nothing comparable to modern physical science was involved in this catastrophic devaluation or spiritual denudation of the universe. We need only observe that this universe became thoroughly demonized in the Gnostic period. Yet this, taken with the transcendence of the acosmic self, resulted in curious analogies to the phenomena of existentialism in the vastly different modern setting. If not science and technology, what caused, for the human groups involved, the collapse of the *cosmos* piety of classical civilization, on which so much of its ethics was built?

The answer is certainly complex, but at least one angle of it may be briefly indicated. The classical ontological doctrine of whole and parts—according to which the whole is prior to the parts, is better than the parts, and is that for the sake of which the parts are and wherein they find the meaning of their existence—had lost the social basis of its validity. The living example of such a whole had been the classical *polis*, whose citizens had a stake in the whole, and could affirm its superior status in the knowledge that they, the parts, however passing and exchangeable, maintained it with their own being, and that their actions made a difference to the being and perfection of the whole. This whole, the condition for the existence and wellbeing of the individual, was thus in addition the framework for the fulfilment of man's aspirations.

The ontological principle survived the conditions of its conception. With the absorption of the city states into the monarchies of the Diadochs and finally into the Roman empire, which deprived the *polis* intelligentsia of its constructive function, the relation no longer held politically. But Stoic pantheism, the physico-theology of post-Aristotelian monism, substituted for it the relation between the individual and the *cosmos*, the larger living whole. By this substitution the classical doctrine of whole and parts was kept in force even though it no longer reflected the actual situation of man. Now the *cosmos* was declared to be the great "city of gods and men," and to be a citizen of the universe, a *cosmopolites*, was now considered to be the goal by which otherwise isolated man could set his bearings. He was asked, as it were, to adopt the cause of the universe as his own, that is, to identify himself with that cause directly, across all intermediaries, and to relate his inner self, to relate his *logos*, to the *logos* of the whole.

The practical side of this identification consisted in his affirming and faithfully performing the role allotted to him by the whole, in just that place in which cosmic destiny had set him. "To play one's part"—that figure of speech on which Stoic morals dwelt so much—unwittingly reveals the fictitious element in the structure. A role played is substituted for a real function performed. The actors on the stage behave "as if" they acted their choice, and "as if" their actions mattered. What actually matters is only to play well rather than badly, with no genuine relevance to the outcome. The actors, bravely playing, are their own audience.

In the phrase of playing one's part there is a bravado that hides a deeper despair, and only a shift in attitude is needed to view the great spectacle quite differently. Does the whole really care, does it concern itself in the part that is I? The Stoics averred that it does by equating *heimarmene* with *pronoia*, cosmic fate with providence. And does my part, however I play it, really contribute, does it make a difference to the whole? The Stoics

averred that it does by their analogy between the *cosmos* and the city. But the very comparison brings out the artificiality of the construction, for—in contrast to what is true in the *polis*—no case can be made out for my relevance in the cosmic scheme, which is entirely outside my control and in which my part is thus reduced to a passivity which in the *polis* it had not.

To be sure, the strained fervor by which man's integration in the whole was maintained, through his alleged affinity to it, was the means of preserving the dignity of man and thereby of saving a sanction for a positive morality. This fervor, succeeding that which had formerly been inspired by the ideal of civic virtue, represented a heroic attempt on the part of the intellectuals to carry over the life-sustaining force of that ideal into fundamentally changed conditions. But the new atomized masses of the empire, who had never shared in that noble tradition of *areté*, reacted very differently to a situation in which they found themselves passively involved: a situation in which the part was insignificant to the whole, and the whole alien to the parts. The Gnostic aspiration was not to "act a part" in this whole, but—in existentialist parlance—to "exist authentically." The law of empire, under which they found themselves, was an external dispensation of dominating, unapproachable force; and, for them, the same character was assumed by the law of the universe, cosmic destiny, of which the world state was the terrestrial executor. The very concept of law was modified in all its aspects—natural law, political law, moral law.

I leave it to the reader to draw whatever analogies there are between this alienation of man from his world and the situation of atomized industrial society. Such analogies, I am sure, would supplement from the social angle the effects I have attributed to the cosmology of modern science, on the testimony of Pascal. As in late antiquity, so today, the term "world" contains two meanings at once: nature in general, and social reality. And it may well be the latter which preeminently determines man's relation to "the world," the sum of things.

IV

The subversion of the idea of law, of *nomos*, leads to a moral consequence in which the nihilistic implications of the Gnostic acosmism, and at the same time the analogy to the Nietzsche-Heidegger-Sartre strain of existentialism, become even more obvious than in the cosmological aspect: the antinomism of Gnosticism. To begin with, it is to be conceded that antinomism—the rejection of any objective norm of conduct—is argued on vastly different theoretical levels in the two cases, and that antinomistic Gnosticism appears crude, and perhaps less profound, in comparison with the subtlety and pitiless historical self-elucidation of antinomistic existentialism. What is being liquidated, in the one case, is the moral heritage of a thousand years of ancient civilization; added to this, in the other, are two thousand years of Occidental Christian metaphysics as background to the idea of a moral law.

Nietzsche expressed the root of the nihilistic situation in the phrase "God is dead," meaning primarily the Christian God. The Gnostics, if asked to summarize similarly the metaphysical basis of their own nihilism, could have said only "the God of the cosmos is dead"—is dead, that is, as a god, has ceased to be divine for us and therefore to afford the lodestar for our lives. Admittedly the catastrophe in this case is less comprehensive and thus less irremediable, but the vacuum that was left, even if not so bottomless, was felt no less keenly.

To Nietzsche the meaning of nihilism is that "the highest values become devaluated" (or "invalidated"), and the cause of this devaluation is "the insight that we have not the slightest justification for positing a transcendence, or an 'in itself' of things, which is 'divine,' which is morality incarnate."⁴ This utterance, taken with that about the death of God, bears out Heidegger's statement that "the names God and Christian God are in Nietzsche's thought used to denote the transcendental (supra-sensible) world in general. God is the name for the realm of ideas and

⁴ *Wille zur Macht*, §§ 23, 24; cf. *ibid.*, § 4, "to live alone, 'without God and morals.'"

ideals" (*Holzwege*, p. 199). Since it is from this realm alone that any sanction for values can derive, its fading, that is, the "death of God," means not only the actual devaluation of highest values, but the loss of the very possibility of obligatory values as such. To quote once more Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche, "The phrase 'God is dead' means that the transcendental world is without effective force."

In a modified, rather paradoxical way this statement applies also to the Gnostic position. It is true, of course, that its extreme dualism is of itself the very opposite of an abandonment of transcendence. The transmundane God represents transcendence in the most radical form. In him the absolute beyond beckons across the enclosing cosmic shells. But this transcendence, unlike the "intelligible world" of Platonism or the world lord of Judaism, does not stand in any positive relation to the sensible world. It is not the essence of that world, but its negation and cancelation. The Gnostic God, as distinct from the demiurge, is the totally different, the other, the unknown. Like his inner-human counterpart, the acosmic self or *pneuma*, which, otherwise hidden, also reveals itself only in the negative experience of otherness, of non-identification and of protested indefinable freedom, this God has more of the *nihil* than the *ens* in his concept. A transcendence withdrawn from any normative relation to the world is equal to a transcendence which has lost its effective force. In other words, for all purposes of man's relation to existing reality, this hidden God is a nihilistic conception: no *nomos* emanates from him, no law for nature and thus also no law for human conduct as a part of the natural order.

On this basis the antinomistic argument of the Gnostics is as simple as for instance that of Sartre. Since the transcendent is silent, Sartre argues, since "there is no sign in the world," man, the "abandoned," reclaims his freedom, or rather, cannot help taking it upon himself: he "is" that freedom, man being "nothing but his own project," and "all is permitted to him."⁵ That this

⁵ *L'existentialisme est un humanisme*, pp. 33 ff.

freedom is of a desperate nature, and, as a compassless task, inspires dread rather than exultation, is a different matter.

In Gnostic reasoning we sometimes meet the merely subjectivist form of the antinomistic argument: nothing is naturally bad or good, things in themselves are indifferent, and only by human opinion are actions good or bad. Spiritual man, in the freedom of his knowledge, has the indifferent use of them all. While this reminds one of nothing more than of classical Sophism, the real metaphysical background to this superficially skeptical subjectivism comes to light in the deeper Gnostic reflection on the source of such human opinions.

The ultimate source turns out to be not human but demiurgical, and common with that of the order of nature. Its product, the "law," is thus not really indifferent, but is part of the great design upon our freedom. Being *nomos*, the moral code is but the psychical complement to the physical *nomos* and, as such, the internal aspect of the all-pervading cosmic rule. Both emanate from the lord of the world as agencies of his power, unified in the double aspect of the Jewish God as creator and legislator. Just as the law of the physical world, the *heimarmene*, integrates the individual bodies into the general system, so the moral law integrates the souls, and thus makes them subservient to the demiurgic scheme.

For what is the law—either as revealed through Moses and the prophets or as operating in the actual habits and opinions of men—but the means of regularizing and thus stabilizing the implication of man in the business of the world and worldly concerns; of setting by its rules the seal of seriousness, of praise and blame, reward and punishment, on his utter involvement; of making his very will a compliant party to the compulsory system, which thereby will function all the more smoothly and inextricably? In so far as the principle of this moral law is justice, it has the same character of constraint on the psychical side that cosmic fate has on the physical side. "The angels that created the world established 'just actions,' to lead men by such precepts into servitude"

(Simon Magus). In the normative law man's will is taken care of by the same powers that dispose of his body. He who obeys it has abdicated the authority of his self.

It is not possible here to go into the anarchical and sometimes libertinistic consequences of this attitude. Incidentally, the consequences can be either libertinistic or ascetic, and actually, except for a brief period of revolutionary extremism, they have probably more often been the latter than the former. But the two seemingly opposite attitudes are really of the same root, and are capable of strange combinations. The same basic argument supports them both. The one repudiates loyalty to nature through excess, the other through abstention. The one sometimes makes of the permission to do everything a positive obligation to perform every kind of action, with the idea of rendering to nature its own and thereby exhausting its powers; the other flouts those powers by denying them opportunity and reducing commerce with them to the minimum. Both are lives outside the law. Freedom by abuse and freedom by non-use, equal in their indiscriminateness, are thus only alternative expressions of the same acosmism.

The reference to this root makes it clear that, far beyond what the merely skeptical argument of "subjectivism" suggests, there was a positive metaphysical interest in repudiating allegiance to any objective norm. It was the assertion of the authentic freedom of the self. But it is to be noted that this freedom is not a matter of the "soul," which is as adequately determined by the moral law as the body is by the physical law; it is wholly a matter of the *pneuma*, the indefinable spiritual core of existence, the foreign spark. The soul, *psyche*, is part of the natural order, created by the demiurge to envelop the foreign *pneuma*, and in the normative law the creator exercises control over what is legitimately his own. Psychical man, definable in his natural essence, for instance as rational animal, is still natural man, and is no more admitted to be the authentically existing self of the *pneuma* than in modern existentialism any determinative essence is admitted to prejudice authentic existence.

It is pertinent here to compare an argument of Heidegger's. Against the classical definition of man as the rational animal, Heidegger, in his Letter on Humanism, argues that this definition places man within animality specified only by a differentia which falls within the genus "animal" as a particular quality. This, Heidegger contends, is placing man too low. I suspect there is a verbal sophism involved in thus arguing from the term "animal" as used in the classical definition. But apart from that, in his rejection of the concept of any definable "nature" of man which would subject his sovereign existence to a predetermined essence and thus make him part of an objective order of essences in the whole of nature—in this whole conception of trans-essential, freely "projecting" existence—there is a significant analogy to the Gnostic concept of the trans-psychical negativity of the *pneuma*. This *pneuma* is the bearer of a knowledge peculiar to itself which is radically different from the rational knowledge of the *psyche*. Psychical man, through his reason, owes allegiance, indeed, to the moral law laid down by his creator, the demiurge, and in obediently fulfilling it he has the only chance of being just, that is, properly "adjusted" to the externally established order, and thus of playing his allotted part in the cosmic scheme. But the *pneumaticos*, "spiritual" man, is above the law, beyond good and evil, and a law unto himself in the power of his "knowledge."

Only in passing I wish to remark that Paul's antinomism, though sharing in the general climate of the Gnostic one, is a vastly different matter. It certainly does not grant freedom from the law to any superior "knowledge."

v

But what is this knowledge about, this cognition which is not of the soul but of the spirit, and in which the spiritual self finds its salvation from cosmic servitude? A famous formula of the Valentinian school thus epitomizes the content of *gnosis*: "What makes us free is the knowledge who we were, what we have become;

where we were, wherein we have been thrown; whereto we speed, wherefrom we are redeemed; what is birth and what rebirth."⁶ A real exegesis of this programmatic formula would have to unfold the complete Gnostic myth. Here I wish to make only a few formal observations.

First we note the dualistic grouping of the terms in antithetical pairs, and the eschatological tension between them, with its irreversible directedness from past to future. We further observe that all the terms used are concepts not of being but of happening, of movement. The knowledge is of a history, in which it is itself a critical event.

Among these terms of motion, the one of having "been thrown" into something strikes our attention, because we have been made familiar with it in existentialist literature. We are reminded of Pascal's "Cast into the infinite immensity of spaces," of Heidegger's *Geworfenheit*, "having been thrown," which with him is a fundamental character of the *Dasein*, of the self-experience of existence. The term, as far as I can see, is originally Gnostic. In the Mandaean literature it is a standing phrase: life has been thrown into the world, light into darkness, the soul into the body. It expresses the original violence done to me in making me be where I am and what I am, the passivity of my choiceless emergence into an existing world whose law is not mine. But the image of the throw also imparts a dynamic character to the whole of the existence thus initiated. In our formula this is taken up by the image of speeding toward some end. Ejected into the world, life is a kind of trajectory projecting itself forward into the future.

This brings us to the last observation I wish to make apropos the Valentinian formula: that in its temporal terms it makes no provision for a *present* on whose content knowledge may dwell and, in beholding, stay the forward thrust. There is past and future, where we come from and where we speed to, and the present is only the moment of *gnosis* itself, the peripety from

⁶ Clemens Alex., *Exc. ex Theod.*, 78, 2.

the one to the other in a supreme crisis of the eschatological *now*. There is this to remark, however, in distinction to all modern parallels: the context makes it clear that, though thrown into temporality, we had an origin in eternity, and so also have an aim in eternity. This constitutes a metaphysical background to innercosmic nihilism which is entirely absent from its modern counterpart.

To turn once more to the modern counterpart, let me put before you an observation which must strike the close student of Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit*, that most profound and still most important manifesto of existentialist philosophy. In this book Heidegger develops an ontology of the self according to the modes in which it exists, that is to say, in which it constitutes its being by its existing, and these modes are explicated in a number of fundamental categories which Heidegger prefers to call "existentials." Unlike the objective categories of Kant, they define structures not of reality but of realization—of the active movement of inwardness by which a world of objects is entertained and the self originated as a continuous event. They have, therefore, each and all, a profoundly temporal meaning. The "existentials" are categories of internal or mental time, the true dimension of existence, and they articulate that dimension in its tenses. This being so, they must exhibit, and distribute between themselves, the three horizons of time—past, present, and future.

Now if we try to arrange these "existentials," Heidegger's categories of existence, under these three heads, as it is possible to do, we make a striking discovery—at any rate one that struck me very much when I made it many years ago (at the time even going so far as to draw up a diagram, in the classical manner of a "table of categories"). This is the discovery that the column under the head of "present" remains practically empty. I must hasten to add that this statement, and what follows, is an extreme abridgement. Actually a great deal is said about the existential "present." But it is nothing original in its own right. As far as the term is meant to denote an aspect of *genuine* "existence," it is the

present of the "situation," which is wholly defined in terms of the self's relation to its "future" and "past." It flashes up, as it were, in the light of decision when the projected "future" reacts upon the given "past," and in this meeting constitutes what Heidegger calls the "moment" (*Augenblick*): moment, not duration, is the temporal mode of *this* present—a creature of the other two horizons of time, a function of their ceaseless dynamics, and no independent dimension to dwell in. Detached, however, from this context of inner movement, by itself, "present" denotes precisely the renouncement of genuine future-past relation in the "abandonment" or "surrender" to talk, curiosity, and the like (*Verfallenheit*): a failure of the tension of true existence, a kind of laziness of being. Indeed, *Verfallenheit*, a negative term which also includes the meaning of degeneration and decline, is *the* "existential" proper to "present" as such, showing it to be a derivative and "deficient" mode of existence.

To return, then, to our original statement, we find that all the relevant categories of existence, those having to do with the possible genuineness of existence, fall in correlate pairs under the heads of either past or future: "facticity," necessity, having become, having been thrown, are existential modes of the past; being ahead of oneself, anticipation of death, care and resolve, are existential modes of the future. No present remains for genuine existence to repose in. Leaping off, as it were, from its past, existence projects itself into its future; faces its ultimate limit, death; returns from this eschatological glimpse of nothingness to its sheer factness, the unalterable datum of its already having become this, there and then; and carries this forward with its death-begotten resolve, into which the past has now been gathered up. I repeat, there is no present to dwell in, only the crisis between past and future, the pointed moment between, balanced on the razor's edge of decision which thrusts ahead.

This breathless dynamism holds a tremendous appeal for the contemporary mind, and my generation in the German twenties and early thirties succumbed to it wholesale. But there is a

puzzle in this evanescence of the present as the holder of genuine content, in its reduction to the inhospitable zero point of mere formal resolution. What metaphysical situation stands behind it?

Here an additional observation is relevant. There is, after all, besides the existential "present" of the moment, the presence of things. Does not the co-presence with them afford a "present" of a different kind? But we learn from Heidegger that things are primarily *zuhanden*, that is, usable (of which even "useless" is a mode), and therefore related to the "project" of existence, therefore included in the future-past dynamics. Yet they can also become merely *vorhanden* (standing before me), that is, indifferent objects, and the mode of *Vorhandenheit* is an objective counterpart to what on the existential side is *Verfallenheit*, false present. *Vorhanden* is what is merely and indifferently "extant," the "there" of bare nature, there to be looked at outside the relevance of the existential situation and of practical concern. It is being, as it were, stripped and alienated to the mode of neutral object. This is the status left to "nature"—a deficient mode of reality—and the relation in which it is so objectified is a deficient mode of existence, its defection from the futurity of care into the spurious present of mere onlooking curiosity.

This existentialist depreciation of the concept of nature (the absence of "nature" as a relevant topic from Heidegger's philosophy is in itself a revealing fact) obviously reflects its spiritual denudation at the hands of physical science, and it has something in common with the Gnostic contempt for nature. No philosophy has ever been less concerned about nature, which, for it, has no dignity left to it: this unconcern is not to be confounded with Socrates' refraining from physical inquiry as being above man's understanding.

To look at what is there, at nature as it is in itself, at Being, the ancients called by the name of contemplation, *theoria*. But the point here is that, if contemplation is left with only the irrelevantly extant, then it loses the noble status it once had—

as does the repose in the present to which it holds by the presence of its objects. *Theoria* had that dignity because of its Platonic implications—because it beheld eternal objects in the forms of things, a transcendence of immutable being shining through the transparency of becoming. Immutable being is everlasting present, in which contemplation can share in the brief durations of the temporal present.

Thus it is eternity, not time, that grants a present and gives it a status of its own in the flux of time; and it is the loss of eternity which accounts for the loss of a genuine present. Such a loss of eternity is the disappearance of the world of ideas and ideals in which Heidegger sees the true meaning of Nietzsche's "God is dead": in other words, the absolute victory of nominalism over realism. Therefore the same cause which is at the root of nihilism is also at the root of the radical temporality of Heidegger's scheme of existence, in which the present is nothing but the moment of transience from past to future. If values are not beheld in vision as being (like the Good and the Beautiful of Plato), but are posited by the will as projects, then indeed existence is committed to constant futurity, with death as the goal; and a merely formal resolution to be, without a *nomos* for that resolution, becomes a project from nothingness into nothingness. In the words of Nietzsche quoted before, "Who once has lost what thou hast lost stands nowhere still."

VI

Once more our investigation leads back to the dualism between man and *physis* as the metaphysical background of the nihilistic situation. There is no overlooking one cardinal difference between the Gnostic and the existentialist dualism: Gnostic man is thrown into an antagonistic, anti-divine, and therefore anti-human nature, modern man into an indifferent one. And only the latter case represents the absolute vacuum, the really bottomless pit. In the Gnostic conception the hostile, the demonic, is still anthropomorphic, familiar even in its foreignness, and the

contrast itself gives direction to existence—a negative direction, to be sure, but one that has behind it the sanction of the negative transcendence to which the positivity of the world is the qualitative counterpart. Not even this antagonistic quality is granted to the indifferent nature of modern science, and from that nature no direction at all can be elicited.

This makes modern nihilism infinitely more radical and more desperate than Gnostic nihilism ever could be, for all its panic terror of the world and its defiant contempt of its laws. That nature does not care, one way or the other, is the true abyss. That only man cares, in his finitude facing nothing but death, alone with his contingency and the objective meaninglessness of his projecting meanings, is a truly unprecedented situation.

But this difference, which reveals the greater depth of modern nihilism, also challenges its self-consistency. Gnostic dualism, fantastic as it was, was at least self-consistent. The idea of a demonic nature against which the self is pitted, makes sense. But what about an indifferent nature which nevertheless contains in its midst something to which its own being does make a difference? The phrase of having been flung into indifferent nature is a remnant from a dualistic metaphysics, a phrase to whose use the existentialists' own monistic beliefs give them no right. What is the throw without the thrower, and without a beyond whence it started? Rather should the existentialist say that life—conscious, caring, knowing self—has been “thrown up” *by* nature. If blindly, then the seeing is a product of the blind, the caring a product of the uncaring, a teleological nature begotten unteleologically.

Does not this paradox cast doubt on the very concept of an indifferent nature, that abstraction of physical science? So radically has anthropomorphism been banned from the concept of nature that even man must cease to be conceived anthropomorphically if he is just an accident of that nature. As the product of the indifferent, his being, too, must be indifferent. Then the facing of his mortality would simply warrant the reaction “Let

us eat and drink for tomorrow we die." There is no point in caring for what has no sanction behind it in any creative intention. But if the deeper insight of Heidegger is right—that, facing our finitude, we find that we care, not only whether we exist but how we exist—then the mere fact of there being such a supreme care, anywhere within the world, must also qualify the totality which harbors that fact, and, having given rise to it physically, cannot be only the indifferent externality of a-teleological science.

The disruption between man and total reality is at the bottom of nihilism. The illogicality of the rupture makes its fact no less real, or its seeming alternative more acceptable: the stare at isolated selfness, to which it commits man, may seek release—and has found it—in a monistic naturalism which, along with the rupture, would abolish also the idea of man as man. Between that Scylla and this her twin Charybdis, the modern mind hovers. Whether a third road is open to it—one by which the fatal dualism can be overcome and yet enough of the dualistic insight saved to uphold the humanity of man—philosophy will have to find out.

SCHUMPETER'S IMPERIALISM— A CRITICAL NOTE*

BY MURRAY GREENE

DESPITE its many brilliant individual insights, its sweeping historical range, and its bold and challenging syntheses, Schumpeter's thesis in his essay on "The Sociology of Imperialisms" is, to my mind, basically inadequate and misleading as a generalized theory of imperialism.¹ It appears to me that the main burden of Schumpeter's argument is to show that capitalism is essentially anti-imperialist. To do this he develops a very specialized definition of imperialism which he then expounds with references to certain selected societies in history. He also sets up a very specialized definition of capitalism, which he then shows to be inconsistent with his definition of imperialism, thereby "proving" that capitalism is anti-imperialist.

I

Schumpeter defines imperialism as "the objectless disposition on the part of a state to unlimited forcible expansion." This disposition derives from a warrior-class social structure which requires "expansion for the sake of expanding, war for the sake of fighting, victory for the sake of winning, dominion for the sake of ruling."

One is immediately struck by how much is excluded by this definition. All instances in history or prehistory of expansion for the purpose of obtaining fertile land, grazing areas, hunting

* EDITORS' NOTE—In this article we present a divergent opinion regarding the theses discussed by Eduard Heimann in "Schumpeter and the Problems of Imperialism," in *Social Research*, vol. 19 (June 1952).

¹ The essay was written during World War I, and first appeared in the *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, in 1919. It has now been published in J. A. Schumpeter, *Imperialism and Social Classes*, tr. by Heinz Norden, ed. and with an introduction by Paul M. Sweezy (New York 1951).

grounds, precious minerals, plunder, tribute, slaves, colonization areas, or commercial advantages are automatically excluded, because there was a specific object in mind. Also excluded, and most important of all for modern times, is expansion for the purpose of acquiring industrial raw materials, markets, capital investment areas, and cheap labor power. Because such instances of expansion serve a concrete interest they are not instances of imperialism. It is immediately apparent that Schumpeter's definition focuses attention exclusively on the internal compulsions of the particular expanding society, with no regard whatever for what it is that constitutes the object or goal, as such, of the expansion.

The onesidedness of Schumpeter's definition can perhaps best be shown by a comparison with the Marxist concept of capitalist imperialism. The Marxist concept also stresses the internal compulsions of the expanding society; and to a certain extent there is a similarity to the Schumpeter idea of limitlessness, in that capitalist expansion must press on and on, ever exhausting new areas of exploitation. But in the Marxist concept the relationship between subject and object is not meaningless. The subject has the need for expansion, but it is not just expansion for its own sake. The object of the expansion—markets, for example—is organically (dialectically) related to the specific needs of the subject. The expansion may be limitless, but it is not, like Schumpeter's, objectless, nor is it merely functional in a purely subjective sense.

Schumpeter's sole preoccupation with the subject is an abstraction of a portion of reality, and consequently a misleading distortion. Thus his almost ludicrous explaining away of British imperialism is not just a case of a particular miss which lowers an otherwise good batting average. It is a consequence of his subjectivistic approach, which necessarily excludes British overseas expansion—whether of the eighteenth-century period of commercial capitalism or the nineteenth-century period of industrial and finance capitalism—because in neither period could

English society be termed a society based on a warrior-class social structure.

Schumpeter's additional qualification—that imperialism must be forcible—limits the definition even more. There are different kinds of force which states have applied and do apply against one another for the purpose of expansion. But Schumpeter means by force only military force. He must mean this to support his thesis. Thus one country's control of another through the superiority of its economic power (perhaps best illustrated in Latin America); the penetration of industrial products into native village or craft economies, and the shattering effects that this has on the economic and social structures of those economies (North Africa, the Near East, the Far East); the bribery or coercion of feudal chieftains or tribal leaders in an effort to persuade them to relinquish control of the labor power or resources of their domains (the Near East); the swindling of unsophisticated natives into bartering away their land and resources for trinkets, badges of prestige, or paper treaties (Africa); the forcing of loans on spendthrift or inexperienced governments, to serve as an entering wedge for foreign control (North Africa, the Caribbean)—these and other devious means cannot, by Schumpeter's definition, be termed imperialistic.

Even the threat of force—and more often than force itself this is all that is necessary—cannot be termed imperialistic, because, for Schumpeter, it is only in the actual application of military force that imperialism serves its true function for the subject. Thus even Roman imperialism (of which Schumpeter's brief analysis is marvelously stimulating) does not properly fit into his definition, for here the imperialistic actions, designed to strengthen the latifundian landlords' control of the state apparatus and to head off internal land reform, have not the same function as those in his classic instances of the Egyptian, Assyrian, Persian, and Arab Moslem warrior societies.

Is it not strange that the two imperialisms most important for Western civilization are, in the one case, excluded altogether,

and, in the other, assigned an atypical, special role—and this in a theory that purports to be a generalized definition of imperialism? Why, then, does Schumpeter construct his definition in this way? Why must imperialism be “objectless” as well as “forcible”?

The answer is that Schumpeter's imperialism is a onesided, sociological phenomenon—the expression of a warrior-class social structure which fights because it is geared to fighting and has no other reason for existence. It is obvious that if expansion had a specific, limited aim, or if it were non-forcible, it would not necessarily fit this type of society. It could, for example, be an economic phenomenon and serve a non-warrior-class structure. Thus when Schumpeter comes to the analysis of capitalism he need only apply the following syllogism, inherent in his previous build-up: what is not the expression of a warrior-class social structure is not imperialism; capitalist society is not a warrior-class social structure; therefore capitalist society is non-imperialist. He then adds, to explain a few odds and ends, that what may look like capitalist imperialism just happens to occur in the era of capitalism, and is really only the remnants left from a past or passing age.

II

Let us now turn to Schumpeter's discussion of capitalism. Just as he abstracts from history a certain type of expansionism and terms it the true prototype of imperialism, so, too, he abstracts a certain type of capitalism and presents it as the true model of all capitalism.

Schumpeter takes the position that in capitalism there is no inherent economic drive toward imperialism. Tendencies toward economic expansionism he treats as coming under the heading of protectionism and monopolism. Protectionism and monopolism, he argues, are not endemic to capitalism, but are against its true spirit. They are opposed to the interests of most producers and of all consumers within the national economy itself,

and are contrary to the interests of all nations as members of the international community. Where protectionism and monopolism exist, they are the outcome of the incomplete success of capitalism in its struggles with the monarchical power. To illustrate this, Schumpeter contrasts the early and complete success of British capitalism—and its consequent lack of tariffs and monopolies—with the partial and later development of capitalism on the Continent—and its consequent dependence on the state apparatus, which entailed carrying over ideas and practices from a former age.

As with Schumpeter's other ideas, there is some truth here; but, as elsewhere, the partial truth is used in place of the broader truth, not to supplement it. True, British capitalism of the latter half of the nineteenth century was featured by free trade. But was this because the British ruling classes were successful in their seventeenth-century struggle against the crown, or was it because the successful outcome of that struggle resulted in conditions that paved the way for British capitalism's initial industrial supremacy and its preeminence in the markets of the world? Of course the seventeenth-century political developments were important! But can anyone possibly maintain that British capitalism of the latter half of the nineteenth century would have been what it was if, instead of having had the field to itself in the early nineteenth century, it had been confronted from the very beginning by two such rivals as Germany and the United States? Or if, from the very beginning, it had started out as Germany did—having no worldwide empire, with almost limitless market opportunities already assured by political control, preestablished commercial contacts, and other ties? Of course Victorian England was a free-trade nation! But this was not because England had by then attained to "true" capitalism. It was because England had come first on the scene with the most; because the English economy could not have functioned as the industrial, financial, and trading center of the world without free trade. Where, outside of nineteenth-century England, has this "pure," protection-

less, monopoly-less capitalism existed at any time among the great powers?

This preeminence in world markets of nineteenth-century England not only explains, I believe, the free-trade character of English capitalism, but also affected the capitalisms which came to the fore later, and which, in their developmental stages, had to contend with the existing condition of English supremacy. It is significant, for example, that American capitalism, which developed unimpeded by monarchical power, and German capitalism, where the monarchical element was a factor, were both characterized by strong tendencies toward protectionism and monopolism.

In arguing that protectionism is a mere atavism, and that the logic of capitalism tends toward internationalism and free trade, Schumpeter generalizes on the basis of an atypical model and consequently misses the following basic points: that capitalism was organized along national lines and developed unevenly among the nations of the world; that this development was not smoothly upward, but was featured by fits and starts, including periods when factors lay idle and wanting employment; that finance monopolism played an increasingly key role as that development proceeded; and that these conditions made for an intensified economic rivalry among nations which was abetted rather than abated by the growing concentrations of capital within nations.

In this connection it is interesting to note that Lenin, who was writing on imperialism at about the same time as Schumpeter, also contrasts Disraeli's famous remark of 1852 (on the colonies being millstones) with his attitude some two decades later. But where Schumpeter takes the position that Disraeli seized upon the cry of Imperial Federation as a happy slogan to revive the fortunes of the Tory party, Lenin interprets this change as a symptom that British leaders were already looking uneasily about for some insurance to preserve Britain's position against the growing menace of its more dynamic and efficient

young rivals now coming to the fore—Germany and the United States.

Schumpeter's brilliant dissection of British party politics in the nineteenth century may appeal more to the scholar than the crude hammerblows of Lenin. But it is Lenin's imperialism² which takes account of—indeed, makes into its central feature—the headlong international scramble of the capitalist powers in the final quarter of the nineteenth century to stake out claims in Africa, to secure strategic financial positions in the Balkans and the Middle East, to outmanoeuvre and outgrab one another in the Far East, a scramble that finally culminated in World War I; while it is Schumpeter's imperialism which passes by this scramble and which views World War I as an unprovoked assault of a villainous autocracy against a democratic, peace-loving, anti-imperialist community.

Developments toward economic nationalism since World War I render Schumpeter's atavism theory of protectionism even more untenable. This period's strong and almost universal trend toward autarchy cannot possibly be understood as the revival or survival of eighteenth-century absolutism, but can be comprehended only as deriving from strains and weaknesses within the fold of international capitalism itself.

In this connection, Keynes' notes on mercantilism, demonstrating the advantages of a regulated system in stimulating output where idle factors are present, make far more sense for the period of later-day capitalism than Schumpeter's atavism theory—for Schumpeter's thesis of free trade, basing itself on the beauties of classical theory, assumes full employment, perfect competition, and complete mobility of factors, conditions hardly typical of later-day capitalism. Certainly it would not matter who built a particular railroad in Central Africa—if there were no special need for British, or German, or American capital to go there

² Here Lenin borrowed heavily from Hobson and Hilferding—a debt which he himself readily acknowledged. But the theory of uneven development was Lenin's own, and was a refutation of Hilferding's theory of the all-embracing international cartel.

rather than anywhere else it chose to go; *if* there were no special stimulation to be derived by British, or German, or American heavy industry in building it; *if* there were no special advantages to British, or German, or American textile industries in selling piecegoods to the African railroad workers, since these industries could market their wares anywhere and at any time they liked. But what kind of world is Schumpeter talking about to deny these special needs—or to attribute such needs to a hangover from a former era?³

III

We may now turn briefly to Schumpeter's argument that the sociology of capitalism—its social atmosphere, attitudes, and ideals—is antithetical to imperialism. Capitalism, he says, is rationalistic. It fosters democratization and individualization. It does away with blind loyalties to monarch, lord, or clan, and produces an atrophy of the martial spirit and the instinctive urge to aggression. Since capitalist rationalism stresses self-interest, and since imperialism is irrational and contrary to the interests of the majority, members of the capitalist society increasingly reject imperialism. In this rejection they are strengthened politically and morally by the tendency of capitalism to foster democratization and individualization. Furthermore, fighting is distasteful and unsuited to the bourgeois mind. The bourgeoisie, by its inherent disposition, cannot furnish the magnetic and forceful leadership needed by an imperialist state.

³ Schumpeter himself, I believe, did not press his atavism view of protectionism and monopoly in his later writings. Rather he stressed the viewpoint that the abandonment of laissez faire resulted from the social developments produced by changes in capitalism itself—developments that began to be manifest in the 1890's and consisted in the growth of the New Middle Class, the rise of the political power of labor, the gradual spread of anti-capitalist attitudes on the part of society as a whole, including the capitalists themselves, and similar forces, chiefly sociological and political. See his *Business Cycles* (New York 1939) vol. 1, pp. 398-400, and vol. 2, pp. 696-700. In *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (3rd ed. New York 1950) his chapter on monopoly stresses the relationship of monopoly to the function of innovation, and emphasizes its temporary and incomplete nature; nothing is said there of the atavism view, although the treatment is economic rather than historical.

Now there is no question that rising capitalism leveled the weapons of rationalistic inquiry against the irrational (because outmoded) integument of feudalism, or that the development of modern science was closely linked with the rise of capitalism. But does this necessarily mean that capitalism as a system is rational? True, the individual capitalist has organized his equipment and technique of production along the most scientific lines. His bookkeeping is a triumph of cost accounting. And when he expands or curtails operations in accordance with market demands, he is certainly acting "rationally" in his own eyes. But rationally in relation to what? To a set of forces over which neither he nor anyone else can exert control, which has developed intensifying periodic crises, which keeps a significant portion of its human and capital resources in alternating states of enforced idleness, which tends to find solution more and more in production of goods that lie *outside* the "rational" mechanism of the market—namely, armaments.

The irony of a superbly rational productive apparatus standing idle while human needs go unfilled, of an awesome scientific technique producing implements of death—is it not this irony that has converted capitalism's former meliorism, optimism and faith in progress, into a bleak cynicism; which has turned capitalist culture, its art, literature, and music, increasingly away from the realism it once fostered and toward a "revolt from reason," toward a conscious glorification of the irrational, toward feudal Catholicism, mysticism, escapism, and faddism? Is it not the "rational" capitalist era which has developed such rationalizations as racism, "the white man's burden," "manifest destiny," chauvinism, and the doctrine of "national interest"? If the world history of the last seventy-five years indicates anything, it indicates that the feudal age had no monopoly on incitements to war, that capitalism itself is quite equal to providing its own shibboleths and slogans to drag its masses into military conquest.

Much the same can be said of individualization and democratization. Early capitalism, struggling against feudal fetters,

did foster these tendencies, in its own way and for its own purposes. Decadent capitalism, fostering an undemocratic concentration of economic and political power, bends the democratic process to its own ends, restricts opportunity, enforces mass attitudes, tastes, and conformities, and thereby negates its own early promises. The "individual," whom early capitalism liberated from the integrative feudal universe, is converted to a cipher. The individualization and democratization of nineteenth-century American capitalism, to cite only one specific instance, did not stand for a moment against the lords of the jingo press, whose efforts stampeded public opinion into a war with Spain in 1898—a war that must be characterized as imperialist if the term is to mean anything.

Schumpeter presents the typical bourgeois as a man of pre-eminently peaceful disposition, preoccupied with his concern of making money, meekly envious of the lordly aristocracy whom he can never hope to emulate but upon whom he must depend for those qualities of leadership necessary for the functioning of the state machine. Is it not strange that this bourgeois group should, in one context, be described by the author as including the driving, ruthless, pioneering innovators, the daring organizational geniuses, the men of vision whose dynamic force propels all society along with them—and that in another context it should be described, when once outside its little circle of economic activities, as not capable of "saying boo to a goose"?

Here again is an instance of Schumpeter's seeing early capitalism as the ideal of all capitalism. Schumpeter's peaceable bourgeois did indeed exist. Balzac gives us a perfect insight into the typical early bourgeois, confined to his counting house, piling penny upon penny, once outside his shop cutting a comical and almost pathetic figure in the society of his betters. But Balzac wrote in the early nineteenth century. One need only contrast Balzac's (and Schumpeter's) bourgeois of 1830 with the captains of industry of 1890 to see how inapplicable this early type is for the period of mature capitalism.

Schumpeter's thesis defining imperialism as the expression of a warrior-class social structure is untenable as a generalized theory of imperialism. Its inadequacies show up most clearly in its application to capitalism, the attempt at such an application resulting in a distortion of the nature of capitalism, including the positing of unacceptable supporting explanations, such as the atavism theory. Schumpeter's attempt to establish a theory true for ancient Egypt, feudal France, and twentieth-century capitalism results not in a generalized theory but in an unhistoric abstraction.

THE "FOUR WISHES" IN THOMAS' THEORY OF SOCIAL CHANGE

BY GISELA J. HINKLE

THE long-established eminence of W. I. Thomas as one of America's foremost sociologists has recently been confirmed by various writers who have particularly stressed his resolute insistence on the use of modern, scientific methodology, and the excellence of his specific researches on the immigrant, the delinquent, and the child.¹ None of his encomiasts, however, has observed the unity given his work by his persistent interest in the problem of social change.

Possibly the recent professional disrepute of the terms in which social change was cast when Thomas began his career—"social evolution" and "progress"—has been prejudicial to any such recognition. In any event, when Thomas' sociological contributions are examined with reference to the unifying theme of social change, the interrelatedness of his works becomes explicit and their larger social-intellectual context is evident. This paper, while it will occasionally comment briefly on the social setting, will address itself more specifically to documenting the persistence of Thomas' interest in change, and to analyzing the fundamental presuppositions of his theory and concepts.

Warning must be given immediately against construing this as an essay in systematic sociology. Barnes, Faris, and Volkart

¹ See Harry Elmer Barnes, "William Isaac Thomas," in *An Introduction to the History of Sociology* (Chicago 1948) pp. 793-804; Ernest W. Burgess, "William I. Thomas as a Teacher," in *Sociology and Social Research*, vol. 32 (March-April 1948) pp. 760-64; Ellsworth Faris, "William I. Thomas (1863-1947)," *ibid.*, pp. 755-59; Florian Znaniecki, "William I. Thomas as a Collaborator," *ibid.*, pp. 765-67; "In Memoriam: William Isaac Thomas, 1863-1947," in *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 53 (March 1948) p. 387; Howard W. Odum, *American Sociology* (New York 1951); Edmund H. Volkart, *Social Behavior and Personality* (New York 1951); Kimball Young, "William I. Thomas," in *American Sociological Review*, vol. 13 (February 1948) pp. 102-04.

have all called attention to the fact that Thomas was neither a systematic theorist nor interested in systematic theory. It is true that Volkart, in his recently published collection of Thomas' writings, has nevertheless undertaken to systematize the latter's theories by utilizing the nature of social behavior as his starting point; however, he not only found his task difficult, but has expressed doubts as to its success.² And there is a strong presumption that the limited success of the project may have as its cause the superimposition of an extraneous problem on Thomas' works in such a way that emphasis is directed away from the actual, unifying problem of social change.

I

Like many other sociologists of the era before World War I, Thomas originally formulated his interests in a Darwinian context. Man, he held, is instinctively predaceous, but as evolution has progressed he has learned to modify his animal drives—particularly those for food and sex—into socially acceptable habits conducive to cooperative living. Thomas' earliest work, *Sex and Society* (1907), examined the role of the sexes in the evolution of civilization and the associated psychic structures most efficient in the struggle for survival.

Signaling an interest in evolution by its very title, Thomas' *Source Book for Social Origins* (1909) unmistakably supports this approach in the first sentence of the introduction (p. 3): "The general acceptance of an evolutionary view of life and the world has already deeply affected psychology, philosophy, morality, education, sociology, and all of the sciences dealing with man. This view involves a recognition of the fact that not a single situation in life can be completely understood in its immediate aspects alone. Everything is to be regarded as having an origin and a development, and we cannot afford to overlook the genesis and the stages of change."

² Volkart, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-3; see also Ellsworth Faris' review of Volkart in *American Sociological Review*, vol. 16 (December 1951) p. 875.

A decade later, in *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* (1918-19), written with Florian Znaniecki, Thomas was still directly concerned with evolution, although the focus of this work was the specific problem of the Poles as peasants and immigrants. In the famous methodological note the justification for the research was derived from the progressive subjection of social evolution, or social becoming, to rational control. It was held that while such rational control is as yet in its earliest stages, the need for it is increasing rapidly, because the process of change has been accelerated and the crises to be met have become more frequent and varied in a complex and fluid modern world. The old adjustment process which existed in stable social organizations, and was characterized by a "gradual, empirical, unmethodical elaboration of approximately adequate means of control," was considered too slow and unsatisfactory. Once conscious control of social evolution has become a necessity, the best way to assure its adequacy for future problems is to institute a science of sociology, permitting practical application in the direction of change. Toward this end the study of the Poles was undertaken, in accordance with methodological conceptions stressing comparative scientific research.

Thus the choice of the Polish peasants as material for the investigation was incidental to the more far-reaching interest in the process of change (note vol. 1, p. 74). To be sure, this initial problem of evolution, after it had led to an interest in the Polish immigrant's adjustive efforts in a new environment, was pushed into the background—thus illustrating an interesting mechanism in the sociology of knowledge, for it frequently occurs that when related issues or instances are raised, the larger problem is lost or forgotten in the exploration of the derivative one. But though the fact is traditionally overlooked by sociologists, it remains true that the basic problem of the famous Polish peasant research was that of evolution.

Even in *The Unadjusted Girl* (1923), where he was directly committed to discovering the causes of delinquent behavior in

girls, Thomas viewed his problem as a specific manifestation of evolution. There he held that modern men and women, having evolved from lower animal life, are capable of exercising choice or free will through defining the situation (pp. 41-42), but delinquent girls exercise their free wills in opposition to the cultural norms of society. To explain the process whereby girls develop these peculiarly asocial definitions of situations to satisfy their wishes is the problem for sociologists.

Social change was likewise the ultimate concern in the general treatise on the demoralization of American youth, *The Child in America* (1927), written in collaboration with Dorothy Swaine Thomas. The problematic behavior of the young has resulted, he contended (p. xiii), from the rapidity of social change:

... we are now witnessing a far-reaching modification of the moral norms of behavior practices of all classes of society. Activities have evolved more rapidly than social structures, personalities more rapidly than social norms. This unstabilization of society and of behavior is probably no more than a stage of disorganization preceding a modified type of reorganization. When old habits break down, when they are no longer adequate, there is always a period of confusion until new habits are established; and this is true of both the individual and society. At present, however, it is widely felt that the demoralization of young persons, the prevalence of delinquency, crime, and profound mental disturbances are very serious problems, and that the situation is growing worse instead of better.

Having examined some of the specific manifestations of social change—the immigrant, the delinquent, and the maladjusted child—Thomas returned, in *Primitive Behavior* (1937), to a more general discussion of social change which he viewed as the adjustive effort of societies and of individuals. There he took pains to point out (p. 7) that the traditional evolutionary explanations of social change erred in maintaining that there is a uniform course of cultural and behavioral evolution, that races are innately of different mental capacities, and that geographical isolation hinders social progress.

The uniformity of Thomas' interest in social change, apparent in all his works, contrasts sharply with the multiplicity of his conceptual formulations. His shifts in terminological emphasis, from instincts to attention, to wishes, to attitudes and values, to fields of values, have been variously interpreted. They therefore raise the question whether his explanatory theory of social change underwent comparable alterations during the course of his thinking.

Volkart, in discussing Thomas' concept of the "four wishes," has implied an affirmative answer to this question. Volkart has argued that Thomas eventually found the notion of the four wishes inadequate for scientific purposes because the wishes could neither be demonstrated to exist nor verified, and that he therefore abandoned it in favor of the situational approach, thus moving from a theory of internal dynamics to one stressing the external dynamics of social influences.³ If Volkart's interpretation is correct, it means that the individualistic referent of the four wishes is deprived of its function as the determining source of change.

Such abandonment of a theory of internal dynamics would have made meaningless the problems of individual adjustment and maladjustment with which Thomas repeatedly concerned himself, because adjustment signifies adaptation or conformity by the individual to external conditions. Since an acknowledged acceptance by Thomas of a theory of external dynamics would be of material importance to his fundamental preoccupation with social change and his justification for specific research into problems of adjustment, its possibility must be either firmly established or rejected. In the following analysis of this problem, particular attention will be given to the four wishes from which Volkart's argument takes its departure. Specifically, the source of their formulation and their function in the theory of change will be analyzed in order to reveal the assumptions on which they were based, and to determine whether these persisted in Thomas' later writings.

³ Volkart, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-18, 111.

II

Taking its departure from the notion that evolution occurs in a constant struggle for existence and survival, Thomas' theory of social change always embodied at least two opposed elements which he sometimes referred to as the subjective, or individual, and the objective, or environmental, aspects of social behavior. This "change-through-conflict" theory is readily discernible in his early works, in which he discussed how the instincts for food and sex struggle to wrest their satisfactions from the environment.

In *The Polish Peasant*, emphasis was placed on attitudes and classes of attitudes called wishes. These wishes, common to all mankind, were regarded as aspects of either the individual or the social side of personal evolution; on the individual side are the wishes for security and for new experience, and on the social side are the wishes for response and for recognition. Not only do these two sets of forces contend with each other for a position of dominance; they also struggle with the external world, from which alone they can attain satisfaction. An equilibrium among these forces is ordinarily established in the life of every individual, although sudden alterations of the social situation—as in the case of the Polish immigrants—requires a re-formation of the equilibrated habit patterns. Whenever such habit patterns are altered, social change is said to have occurred.

The view that personal evolution results from the struggling tendencies inherent in man, and the conception that social change derives ultimately from this same source, are comparable to other theories current in Thomas' day, and particularly to the theories of Freud, who stressed the force of the libido in producing civilization. Indeed, the similar usage of the term "wish" by both Freud and Thomas suggests the possibility of an intellectual relationship between them, in spite of Thomas' vehement denials of Freudian influences on his thinking and his frequent pointed critiques of psychoanalytic method. It is believed that an analysis of this relationship will clarify the basic problem with which this paper is concerned.

To those familiar with the diffusion of Freudianism in the United States from 1909 onward,⁴ it will seem particularly noteworthy that the notion of the four wishes was produced in 1918, only five years after the publication of Freud's *The Interpretation of Dreams*, in which the notion of "wish" was most clearly formulated. Harry Elmer Barnes has clearly denied any affinity. "Quite independent of Freud," he has written,⁵ "Thomas, out of his own investigations, developed a set of fundamental wishes, four in number, which express the principal attitudes that one finds in individuals." On the other hand, Florian Znaniecki, collaborator in the Polish peasant study, has said:⁶ "Soon after we had formulated (I believe mostly on his [Thomas'] initiative) the theory of the four main desires which motivate individual participation in primary groups, he suddenly became interested in 'the Freudian wish' as it was called at that time by some American followers of Freud. He did not accept the *libido*, but changed our term *desire* to *wish* and applied 'the four wishes' in the analysis of unadjusted personalities in a way somewhat analogous to the Freudian analysis."

If Znaniecki's assertion can be substantiated, and a relationship demonstrated between the Freudian concept of "wish" and Thomas' "four wishes," the latter's central position in Thomas' theory of internal dynamics and the mechanisms whereby the four wishes function as the source of change can be more readily indicated.

That he was thoroughly acquainted with Freudianism and accepted several of its tenets was demonstrated for the first time by Thomas in *The Unadjusted Girl*, published in 1923. The introduction to this work was written by Mrs. Dummer, a strong pro-

⁴ For discussions of the role of Freudianism in American sociology see Ernest W. Burgess, "The Influence of Sigmund Freud upon Sociology in the United States," in *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 45 (November 1939) pp. 356-74; also Gisela J. Hinkle, "The Role of Freudianism in American Sociology" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1951).

⁵ Barnes, *op. cit.*, p. 800.

⁶ Znaniecki, *op. cit.*, p. 767.

ponent of the Freudian idea that the libido is the creative force in the progress of civilization. Thomas himself conjoined Healy's theory of mental conflict with the notion of blocked wish-fulfilment as the cause of delinquency among girls. Although he minimized the sex wish, his utilization of the mental mechanism of inadequate expression of the wishes for new experience and for recognition was homologous to Freud's theory. This Thomas confirmed in his evaluation of psychoanalysis, wherein he agreed with the stress on wishes but disagreed with the centrality of the sex wish as the focus for life organization.

Freud's theory of the wish, made accessible to American readers through the Brill translation of *The Interpretation of Dreams* in 1913, proposed that unconscious forces or wishes, which normally manifest themselves only during sleep in dreams, motivate all human conduct. Wishes, he held, can also manifest themselves in wit, humor, slips of the tongue, or daydreams, but they are always expressed in disguised or symbolic form. Since Thomas' publications of 1907 and 1909 had made no mention of a wish concept, since Freud's exposition reached American readers only after 1913, and since Thomas—known to be fully familiar with psychoanalysis in 1923—first mentioned the four wishes in 1918, cross-fertilization with respect to the wishes, if it occurred, must have taken place some time between the years 1913 and 1918.

The four wishes were discussed twice in *The Polish Peasant*, once in the first and again in the third volume. According to Znaniecki (in a personal letter to the author, April 3, 1950), the uniformities of the attitudes revealed by the field work prompted their classification into four major categories. These were specified in the methodological note as follows (vol. 1, pp. 72-73):

Every individual has a vast variety of wishes which can be satisfied only by his incorporation in a society. Among his general patterns of wishes we may enumerate: (1) the desire for new experience, for fresh stimulation; (2) the desire for recognition, including, for example, sexual response and general social appreciation, and secured by devices ranging from the display of

ornament to the demonstration of worth through scientific attainment; (3) the desire for mastery, or the "will to power," exemplified by ownership, domestic tyranny, political despotism, based on the instinct of hate, but capable of being sublimated to laudable ambition; (4) the desire for security, based on the instinct of fear and exemplified negatively by the wretchedness of the individual in perpetual solitude under social taboo. Society is, indeed, an agent for the repression of many of the wishes in the individual; it demands that he shall be moral by repressing at least the wishes which are irreconcilable with the welfare of the group, but nevertheless, it provides the only medium within which any of his schemes or wishes can be gratified.

This formulation of the four wishes in volume 1 ("Primary Group Organization," 1918) was amended in volume 3 ("Life Record of the Immigrant," 1919), where the changed behavior of the immigrant was attributed to a modification in the dominance of his wishes. Having evolved a pattern of attitudes and values commensurate with Polish rural life, the peasant discovers it to be inadequate to the demands of the new American situations. In a rural, village type of society the social codes had suppressed the wishes on the individual side of personal evolution, and, because this repression was generally accepted, peasant personalities were arrested at an early stage of development, before individuation could take place. In all rural Poles the strongest wishes are the desires for response and recognition: "The adaptation of the individual to the primary group requires, therefore, that all his attitudes be subordinated to those by which the group itself becomes for him a criterion of all values. These fundamental social attitudes are the *desire for response*, corresponding to the family system in the primary group-organization, and the *desire for recognition*, corresponding to the traditionally standardized system of values upon which the social opinion of the community bases its appreciation" (vol. 3, p. 56).

Production of general psychic similarity among the peasants was held to proceed by means of dialectic interaction between the wishes on the social and those on the personal side of personal

evolution. Those on the social side—the desire for response, whereby individuals adapt themselves to the attitudes of other persons, and the desire for recognition, whereby they adjust to objects—were called the "fundamental social attitudes," and were identified with emotional and rational morality, respectively. Their dialectic opposites are the wishes on the individual side of personal evolution—the desire for new experience and the desire for security, deriving from the innate propensities for curiosity and fear. "To represent these two permanent tendencies as they become parts of character in the course of the social development of a personality we shall use the terms 'desire for new experience' and 'desire for stability'" (vol. 3, pp. 33–34). Since these two wishes on the individual side of personal evolution are constantly struggling for dominance, they are the source of the dynamics of personality development.

When the dominance of the social attitudes demanded by Polish village living was challenged, as a result of the exigencies of existence in America, the re-formation of personalities was radically affected by the conflict between the individual and society. This struggle between the individual and the social wishes, although constantly operative in personal evolution, was distinctly discernible in the adjustive efforts of immigrants. In thus invoking a mechanism of wishes which are constantly conflicting, separately and jointly, this theory of personality development was distinctly a dialectic one, as was the Freudian thesis of the perpetual struggle taking place among the id, the ego, and the super-ego.

Throughout the process of reformulation the wish for new experience and the wish for security remained relatively stable in their meaning. The former was definitely contributed to the schema by Thomas, who based it on his earlier researches into the origin and evolution of man. It is not entirely certain whether it was Thomas or Znaniecki who provided the desire for security or stability.

Noteworthy changes, themselves indicative of connections be-

tween Thomas and Freud, occurred with respect to the two remaining wishes, the desire for recognition and the desire for response, characterizing the social element in the personality. The "desire for mastery, or the 'will to power,'" which appeared in the volume 1 formulation, was omitted from the one in volume 3, where it was incorporated into the wish for recognition. The latter originally included sexual response and general social appreciation, secured through various devices; in volume 3 it was bifurcated into the desire for response and the desire for recognition.⁷ While the earlier wish for recognition was directed toward persons, and thus included sexual response, the later wish for recognition pertained to the traditional social values of objects.

In *The Unadjusted Girl* the four wishes were not materially modified (see pp. 4-9), but it should be noted that in that work Thomas specifically urged that the wishes for recognition and status are necessary to personality formation and development, and that "the lack of them and the fear of never obtaining them are probably the main sources of those psychopathic disturbances which Freudians treat as sexual in origin" (p. 32). While this statement plainly evidenced Thomas' unwillingness to accept Freud's sexual explanations of neurosis, it revealed a surprising and crucial linkage. After Thomas had reformulated the four wishes to subsume the desire for mastery under the wish for recognition, he employed the latter to explain the same phenomena that Freud had ascribed to the force of the sexual wish. Non-satisfaction of the wish for recognition elicits, he contended, the same mental states that Freud treated as consequences of frustrated sexual drives. This similarity of usage of two otherwise separate concepts is not accidental, for both Thomas' wish for recognition and Freud's libido wish had their intellectual antecedent in Nietzsche's "will to power."

The wish for mastery was contributed to Thomas' writings by

⁷ This modification of the wishes has been incorrectly understood by Volkart (*op. cit.*, p. 118), who failed to notice that the wish for mastery became subsumed under the wish for recognition, which itself was altered.

Znaniecki, who acknowledged (in a personal letter to the author, April 3, 1950) having borrowed it from Nietzsche's volitional philosophy. Familiarity with the work of that philosopher, particularly with his notion that in dreams there exist clues about the evolution of the race, had also been avowed by Freud, whose concept of the id was similar to Nietzsche's "primordial part of humanity." Thus Nietzsche was the philosophical antecedent both for the desire for mastery, which later became part of the wish for recognition, and for aspects of Freud's psychoanalytic theory of wish-fulfilment in dreams.

III

So far only books written by Thomas himself have been discussed, but it is pertinent to consider also the widely read text by Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*,⁸ which gives a lengthy exposition of Thomas' four wishes. According to the preface (p. vii), the writing of this text proceeded with considerable guidance from Thomas, and therefore it may be assumed that particularly the exposition of the theory of social forces, which includes the concept of the wishes, was undertaken with Thomas' approval.

In restating an article by Thomas (pp. 480-90), Park and Burgess asserted that the human being possesses a variety of wishes expressed in terms of attitudes toward objects both positive and negative, called values. Positive values satisfy such wishes as the desire for new experience, the desire for security, the desire for recognition, and the desire for response; negative values refer to those objects which obstruct wish fulfilment. Park and Burgess not only presented these wishes categorically, but they integrated them into a total theory of personality development amazingly similar to the Freudian one of the evolution of the libido.

Wishes, they argued, are dynamic social forces; and social forces, following the conceptualization of historians studying the general

⁸ Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (Chicago 1924).

trend of historical change, are the motives and tendencies of persons and events (p. 435). In contrast to the views of reformers, sociologists, they held, do not construe forces as embodied merely in institutions. Being interested in discovering the ultimate or elementary factors in social organization, sociologists resolve institutions "into factors of smaller and smaller denominations until we have arrived at individual men and women" (p. 437). Since individuals can be members of several social organizations with conflicting interests and values, the basic sociological elements are sought "not in the individual but in his appetites, desires, wishes—the human motives which move him to action" (p. 437). These wishes, defined as among the elementary social forces, were specifically held to be influenced by psychoanalysis: "Finally the concept of the wishes, first vaguely apprehended by sociologists under the name 'desires,' having gained a more adequate description and definition in the use made of it by psychoanalysis, has been re-introduced into sociology by W. I. Thomas under the title of the 'four wishes'" (p. 438).

Thus, with Thomas' implicit approval, Park and Burgess make it clear that the formulation of the four wishes was the result of familiarity with Freudianism. As was mentioned above, Znaniecki has said much the same, asserting that Thomas, under Freudian influences, wanted to change his terminology from desires to wishes. The exact nature of this influence may now be briefly indicated.

Around 1916 or 1917, shortly before the publication of the first volume of *The Polish Peasant*, in which the classification of the four wishes was for the first time incorporated, Thomas read a small book by E. B. Holt, entitled *The Freudian Wish and its Place in Ethics* (New York 1915). "I remember," says Znaniecki (personal letter to the author, April 3, 1950), "that he [Thomas] was much interested in it and afterwards wanted to use 'wish' instead of 'desire.'" This statement not only shows clearly that Thomas was influenced in his naming of the four wishes by a proponent of Freudianism, but also points to significant simi-

larities between Thomas' thinking and that of his non-sociological contemporaries.

While Thomas was primarily concerned with the problem of social change, and Holt with the problem of morality, both men pursued their general interests by studying the mechanism of human behavior, a study in which they committed themselves to similar presuppositions. What Holt said about the process of moral judgment-making pertained likewise to Thomas' problem of personal and social evolution.

Holt cast his theory of morality into an evolutionary context. All life, he argued, began as some sort of chemical interaction. Slowly there emerged a mechanism of stimulus and response which finally attained its highest form in human behavior, where it is mediated by consciousness. Human behavior thus began on an organic basis of innate tendencies, and as the individual functioned within an environment and adapted to it, he evolved his wishes. Wishes are units of human behavior developed during the evolutionary process, and though seldom conscious they are universally present in all men. They are at once grounded in tendencies of the organism and related to the objective world. In Holt's words, "the 'wish' is . . . a course of action which some mechanism of the body is set to carry out, whether it actually does so or does not . . . it is dependent on a motor attitude of the physical body, which goes over into overt action and conduct when the wish is carried into execution" (pp. 3-4). Or again, a wish "is a course of action which the body takes or is prepared (by motor set) to take with reference to objects, relations, or events in the environment . . . in this wish or function we have the pure essence of human will, and of the soul itself" (pp. 94-95).

As a causal category, the "wish" contains the *dynamics* of behavior and indicates its *direction*; and both dynamics and direction result from interaction among the wishes. It is in the nature of the wishes—some of which are overt and positive processes of activity, others covert and negative—that some are in accord with one another while others are in conflict. All action requires

choosing among these conflicting wishes. To quote Holt again: "Wishes conflict when they would lead the body into opposed lines of conduct, for it is clear that the body cannot at the same time, say, lie abed and yet be hurrying to catch a train; and this is the source of conflict in all cases, even those where the actual physical interference is too subtle to be readily detected" (p. 33).

Since wishes exert themselves in all acts of daily life, individuals by choosing among them develop character, an assemblage of dominant wishes. A person with moral character is one who solves conflicts of wishes by discrimination, that is, by selecting the good from all existing alternatives. Such selectivity, according to Holt, is motivated not by a teleological end but by fact. Choices are based on the fact of whether or not the empirical conditions contribute to the survival of the organism. Holt seems not to have realized, however, that discrimination based on survival makes fact itself a *telos*, since to survive is a valued goal. In concluding his study of the role of the Freudian wish as the motive power in behavior throughout life, he declared (p. 131):

When all is said and done, the actual life of the will does consist of one long series of dilemmas, decisions to be made between two (or more) alternative courses of action: and the moral life consists in settling these issues "rightly." But then, we ask, what is "right"? The answer indicated by the doctrine of the wish is simple and directly applicable in practice. Right is that conduct, attained through discrimination of the facts, which fulfills all of a man's wishes at once, suppressing none. The moral sanction is fact. The dilemma is always presented really to the intellect and the will together; which latter are in the last analysis one and inseparable.

Thomas' theory of personal evolution was implicitly similar. Both men agreed on a naturalistic determination of human behavior through a dialectic process of conflicting wishes. Like Holt, Thomas maintained that human behavior is moved forward, and directed in this forward movement, by basic units or wishes that are common to all men. Thomas' view that conflict among

the wishes is predetermined was identified by Park and Burgess (p. 439) with the theories of Freud: ". . . in fact it has been one of the great contributions of psychoanalysis to our knowledge of human behavior that it has been able to show that attitudes may be analyzed into still more elementary components and that these components, like the attitudes, are involved in a process of interaction among themselves. In other words there is organization, tension, and change in the constituent elements of the attitudes."

Holt's assertion that a continuous interaction of the organism and the environment is needed for the steady adaptation of the individual to the world in which he lives, and Thomas' theory that the wishes never cease in their search for satisfaction, are closely parallel. Yet the final outcome of the personality—what Holt called character—is dependent on the nature of the society or social environment in which the wishes are satisfied. Accordingly it is possible, according to Holt, that cultures are implicitly either good or evil. In so far as adequate satisfactions are denied to the wishes, the culture can be called evil, for the repressed wishes express themselves in asocial behavior. This is true, for instance, in regard to the unadjusted girl, whose wish for recognition is blocked by modern urban culture. When wisely guided, however, the repressed wishes can find socially acceptable outlets, a mechanism which Freud called "sublimation" and which Thomas accepted from him.⁹

Although Thomas' theory of personality was formulated in terms of abnormal and normal adaptation, and Holt's in terms of moral and immoral choice-making, their basic assertions were similar. Both of them accepted man as having evolved from simpler forms, and the wishes as characterizing the peculiarly human element of behavior. For both, the dynamics and direction of behavior result from the continuous interaction among man's

⁹ Volkart argues that sublimation is one of the few concepts Thomas borrowed directly from psychoanalysis, without altering the meaning. But how could sublimation mean the same thing for Freud and Thomas if their theories of personal evolution were basically different? See Volkart, *op. cit.*, p. 168.

wishes, which seek satisfaction in the outside world, since these similar, basic units of conduct are innately disposed toward agreement or disagreement. The resolution of the conflict among the wishes was for Holt the crux of morality, and for Thomas the basis for adjustment and personal evolution; and just as living is a continuous process of conflicting wishes, morality and adjustive behavior persist throughout life. These similarities make it easier to understand how Thomas could have been influenced by Holt's book on ethics to the extent of transferring the Freudian word "wish," which he found used in it, to his "four wishes."

IV

Thus it seems amply justifiable to maintain that Thomas formulated the four wishes through indirect Freudian influences, and that this concept resembles the psychoanalytic concept of "wish" because: first, the wishes are universal tendencies of human nature to seek satisfactions or goals; second, they are in constant conflict among themselves and with the external world; and third, this continuous struggle is the source of social change and personal evolution. The problems of individual and social adjustment to which Thomas addressed himself are meaningful only if a certain resistance to social pressures is posited in the individual, that is, if there is a will or wish in a direction other than the culture prescribes.

In *The Unconscious* (1927), but little known to sociologists, Thomas appears to reject the notion of the four wishes, as both Volkart and Barnes have pointed out. But while the concept as such was avoided in this work, and thereafter, the mechanisms to which the wishes had reference as the causes of social change were not modified. The basic notion of social change as the product of conflicting qualities of human nature was not altered. The terminological shift was indicated by Thomas in the following paragraphs (pp. 143, 144, 145, 146, 147):

I am assuming, at least for the initial standpoint for the study of the formation of the personality, that there are certain satis-

factions, objects of desire, which men always and everywhere want and seek to secure, and we may speak of these satisfactions as values. These values will be found also to fall into classes or fields . . .

What these fields of the values are I will not elaborate here because I have done this elsewhere and more than once, but I will state my formulation of the matter in outline. . . .

There is, first, the field of new experience . . . the desire for response. . . . A third class of values is the object of what may be called the desire for recognition. . . . Finally, security as attitude and value is opposed to new experience.

Thus the wishes were relabeled fields of values, but the latter were still conceived of as universal strivings. In this sense the meanings of the various different terms that he made use of—wishes, attitudes and values, fields of attitudes and values—are equivalent.

In 1931 Thomas recognized that students of behavior were now approaching the problem of behavior from the situational standpoint, that is, from the perspective of the complex, social relationship. Situations involve institutions, mores, and attitudes of other persons, with which the personality of a given individual conflicts. As Thomas wrote, "The individual always possesses a repertory of attitudes (tendencies to act) and values (goals toward which the action is directed), depending in each case on biological constitution on the one hand and social conditioning on the other."¹⁰ In contending that individuals always possess tendencies to act (attitudes) toward goals (values), Thomas assuredly did not abandon his theory of internal dynamics. When he maintained that it is man's task to adjust his adaptive strivings to the social situations into which he is forced, he might equally well have said that men adjust their wishes in conformity with cultural norms. The concept of the wishes may have been displaced, but the mechanisms of change were unaltered.

When Thomas noted in his last published work, *Primitive*

¹⁰ W. I. Thomas, "The Relation of Research to the Social Process," quoted in Volkart, *op. cit.*, pp. 87-88.

Behavior (1937) how psychic characteristics present at birth affect men's reactions, he implied the conclusion that there is something innate or constitutional about men's attitudes and values (or strivings): "The reaction of different individuals in the same culture to identical cultural influences will depend partly on their different trains of experience and partly on their biochemical constitutions and unlearned psychological endowments" (p. 1). Because the particular experiences and biological endowments of every individual make him unique and unlike the cultural norm, everyone must necessarily make some adjustment to cultural situations. There is, moreover, an emotional element in all adjustive behavior, an element derived from man's goal-oriented tendencies, which Thomas linked to hunger and sex, earlier discussed as instinctive in *Sex and Society*. Thus he wrote, in *Primitive Behavior* (p. 41):

. . . if we examine the sustaining incentives of all goal seeking and adjustive striving we find that they rest on an unrationalized, reflex, and emotional basis. All action patterns are derived from the impulses operating in hunting, killing, capturing, and captivating activities, whether motivated by the hunger or the sex drive. These are the primary "pursuits" and the term has by an appropriate feeling been transferred to more social and abstract pursuits—the pursuit of learning, the pursuit of riches, the pursuit of fame.

In the same work the universality of the emotional basis in all adjustive behavior and goal-seeking was reasserted in slightly different form. Because of the structure of the human organism, life itself is a continuous process of striving, of actualizing goal-oriented tendencies in behavior. The following passage (p. 42) should be noted especially:

. . . if we generalize . . . and view life as a continuous striving for adjustment it is plain that all techniques . . . are aspects of the adjustive conflict, sustained by the unconscious impulses. The emotional components of the reactions are not consciously analyzable but are in the structure of the organism.

In this connection, the impulse in the drive toward a goal which was originally a food or sex object, where the activity was primarily motor in character and dependent for its success on the perfection of technique, is transferred to the pursuit of any goal whatever.

Thus it may be concluded that, in Thomas' theory, as long as human nature and life exist there must be wishes—or call them attitudes and values, or fields of values—which are the cultural manifestations of man's inherent goal-oriented tendencies. It is this goal-orientedness of man which is the ultimate source for social and personal evolution, even in Thomas' works after 1927, when, as Volkart correctly maintains, Thomas ceased his emphasis on the concept of wishes as such. At no time, however, did Thomas propound a theory of change in which the dynamic mechanism was an external one, as Volkart has asserted. Throughout his works, Thomas' theory of social change was one of internal dynamics.

Spanning two eras in the development of American sociology, Thomas' career as a sociologist began during the period concerned with philosophies of history, and extended into the present, with its emphasis on concrete, empirical research. Although he is generally regarded as having inaugurated this second era by his research on the Polish immigrant, Thomas himself never relinquished an original and basic interest in the problem of social evolution which was characteristic of, and derived from, the first era of American sociology. Indeed, even the study of the Polish peasant was fundamentally addressed to the problem of how it might be possible to achieve a rational control of social evolution.

For this single, basic problem pervading all his work, Thomas presented one explanatory theory, an internal, dialectic theory of change. In spite of terminological variations, he always found the source of the dynamics and direction of change to lie in the tendencies of human nature to pursue goals. Although this striving of man to seek satisfactions was referred to by various terms—

instincts, wishes, attitudes, attitudes and values, fields of values, impulses—the meaning was never altered from man as goal-oriented. Because these human tendencies are in constant, dialectic conflict with one another and with the external environment, personal evolution and social change are universal and continuous. An understanding of how these tendencies, which Thomas at one time called wishes, are related to Freud's concept of wish and to Nietzsche's "will to power" not only makes for a better comprehension of their role within Thomas' theory of the mechanisms of change, but brings out his indebtedness to a social-intellectual environment in which the moving force of civilization was seen to reside in man himself.

THE JAPANESE EMPEROR SYSTEM

BY HUGH H. SMYTHE

WHEN the occupation of Japan began, there was interest and speculation surrounding the retention or elimination of the *Tennō*, or Emperor system. The significance of that system was apparent even in the negotiations with the Japanese which culminated in acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, setting forth the conditions of surrender terminating the Pacific phase of World War II, in 1945. The Privy Council of Japan then tried, although unsuccessfully, to have the Allies let them surrender "with the understanding that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as sovereign ruler."¹

In view of the Emperor's unique social function, his special social-historical position in Japan, a careful analysis of what the system means to the Japanese people, and of its significance in the Japanese social fabric, is necessary in order to arrive at any conclusions regarding the desirability of its retention or elimination.

In the reformation of Japan the occupation authorities retained the Emperor system. But Emperor Hirohito has personally renounced any claims to divinity,² and in his new status he is merely, according to the new constitution proclaimed November 3, 1946, "the symbol of State and of the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power" (Chapter I, Article 1). Further, in his new role the Emperor theoretically enjoys only the same legal protection as the average Japanese citizen, all lese majesty

¹ Chitoshi Yanaga, *Japan Since Perry* (New York 1949) p. 619.

² See "Imperial Edict" in "Imperial Rescript on the Reconstruction of New Japan," promulgated January 1, 1946, in *Asahi Shimbun* (Tokyo), January 1, 1946; also, *New York Times*, January 1, 1946.

laws having been eliminated through the influence of the Supreme Commander for the Allied powers.³ Under the occupation the Emperor was reduced to one whose position existed simply in terms of what is understood by "equality before the law." This, in brief, is the official new role of the Emperor of Japan. But how deeply has this official version sunk into the Japanese cultural and social feeling, and to what degree has it become the accepted principle and attitude among the masses of the Japanese people themselves?

As the occupation approached its termination and turned over more and more authority to the Japanese government, incidents developed concerning the Emperor which brought into sharp focus the contrast between an official viewpoint, created by "outsiders," and the Japanese people's own social-cultural feelings toward their formerly divine but now constitutional head of state. This contrast was particularly noticeable in two sections of the government that have tremendous influence over the people (and were extremely important in the prewar and wartime leadership of Japan): the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Judicial Affairs.

Thus in November 1951, when the Emperor was on an inspection tour of certain parts of the country, the people conducted themselves much as they had in the past, when the Emperor was looked upon as a deity rather than as an earthly individual. This tour was marked by the special and excessive cleaning of homes, towns, cities, and villages that had been practiced before the end of the war, when the Emperor was considered divine; by the old-time lining of the passageway along which the Emperor was to pass; by a general humbleness and bowing and quietness on the part of the people, a demeanor that had characterized them in the past, and contrasted strongly to the reception given the Emperor in his tours immediately following the surrender, which were loud

³ General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, *A Brief Progress Report on the Political Reorientation of Japan* (Tokyo: SCAP, Government Section, October 10, 1949) items 8-10, pp. 39-41.

and tumultuous demonstrations, unprecedented affairs of cheering and noise.⁴

During this 1951 trip the Emperor visited the campus of Kyoto University, and some students there demonstrated in such a manner that the university authorities felt it necessary to call out the police. It was pointed out that some students had actually gone up to the car in which the Emperor was riding, looked in at him, and flashed placards they were carrying. As a result of this action it was announced a few days later that the government, in planning a revision of the new Criminal Code to be instituted after the occupation ended, contemplated a revival of legislation with regard to lese majesty against the Emperor.⁵

The Ministry of Education, which was responsible in the past for upholding the sanctity of the Emperor through its various rescripts (particularly the Rescript on Education), laws, and required textbooks in the schools,⁶ came forth in November 1951 with a plan centered around a "People's Moral Code." Basic in the new proposal was the pronouncement that "the Emperor constitutes the center of the people's morals and of the society and

⁴ For a succinct report concerning the people's tendency to redeify the Emperor, and especially their actions during his inspection in November, see "Editor's Note," in *Yomiuri Shimbun* (Tokyo), December 12, 1951. In "Democratic Education," in the *Nippon Times* (Tokyo), November 23, 1951, a male teacher in a lower secondary school decried the fact that only 34 out of 125 students in the first class were able to write the two-ideograph word *Tennō* (Emperor), and complained that the word does not appear in Japanese textbooks in social studies until the third year of high school. See also "Move to Estrange Emperor and People Seen in Kyoto," in *Nippon Times*, November 30, 1951. For a comparison of the present with the former treatment of the Emperor see D. C. Holtom, *Modern Japan and Shinto Nationalism* (Chicago 1947) pp. 174-93.

⁵ See news reports in the *Nippon Times*, especially "Kyoto University Orders Breakup of Radical Campus Group," November 16, 1951; "Eight Students Suspended," November 19, 1951; "Acts of Folly," November 21, 1951; "Kyoto Students Report to Diet," November 22, 1951; "No Revival Planned of Lese Majesty Law" (report from the Attorney General, Takeo Ohashi), November 23, 1951.

⁶ Consult especially *Kokutai no Hongi* (The Fundamental Principles of the National Structure), a textbook made required reading in all the public schools by the central government before and during the war (Tokyo: Japanese Department of Education, 1937). An English translation of the Imperial Edict on Education, promulgated October 30, 1890, appears in Holtom (cited above, note 4) p. 77.

nation," and that he is "a perfect model of morals to be emulated by the people."⁷

In order to understand the developing reemphasis in Japan on such a social symbol as the Emperor, and the effort to return him to his former status, it is necessary to understand the pattern of the Japanese family, for since the establishment of the Yamato Court in 660 B.C.,⁸ the Japanese have carried on a national life organized on a family basis, with each family representing a miniature model of Imperial Japan in which the father stands at the top, just as the Emperor stands at the apex in the nation. Duty toward the Emperor was closely bound up with the parent-child relationship.⁹ This vertical relationship not only persisted through every historical period; it is essentially social-historical, in the sense that the same relationship descended from generation to generation. The belief that all family ancestor gods are related in some degree to Amaterasu-ōmikami, the legendary sun-goddess ancestress of the Emperor, has constituted the strongest unifying bond in Japanese national life.¹⁰ Thus Japanese national life was

⁷ See the editorial, "Reversion to the Past," in *Yomiuri*, November 15, 1951; the editorial, "Morals for the People," in *Nippon Times*, November 18, 1951; "Moral Code Plan Opposed by Professor's Testimony," *ibid.*, p. 1; "Upper House to Study Plan for Moral Code," *ibid.*, November 27, 1951, p. 3; "Amano Bows to Public Opinion; Will Redraft his Moral Code," *ibid.*, November 28, 1951, p. 1.

⁸ According to G. G. Sansom, in his *Japan: A Short Cultural History* (New York 1943) p. 28, "This is now officially considered to be the foundation date of the Empire of Japan and celebrated as such. But it is, of course, a purely traditional date, and even conservative Japanese historians do not all uphold this chronology."

⁹ See M. Takigawa, *Nippon Shakaishi* (Social History of Japan) (Tokyo 1929); *Kokutai no Hongi* (cited above, note 6) p. 26; Atsutane Hirata, "Zoku Shintō" (The Great Principles of Shinto, in *Shintō Daijiten* (The Shinto Encyclopedia), vol. 1 (Tokyo 1937) p. 399; Kazusaku Kanzaki, "Shintō Honkyoku no Kyōri" (The Doctrines of Shinto Honkyoku), in *Uchū* (The Universe), January 1930, pp. 13-15.

¹⁰ For an explanation in English of Amaterasu-ōmikami see Sansom (cited above, note 8) pp. 22-25; *Jinjō Shōgaku Shūshinso: Kyōshiyō* (Textbook of Ethics for Ordinary Primary Schools: Teachers' Manual), vol. 3, p. 55, and vol. 6, pp. 3-4 (Tokyo: Japanese Department of Education, 1931); Kunitake Kume, "Shintō," in *Fifty Years of New Japan*, vol. 2 (London 1910) p. 30; Sadao Araki, "State and Education," in *Contemporary Japan*, vol. 7, no. 3 (December 1938) p. 422; Kan Kikuchi, "Nisen Roppayaku Nen Shishō" (Aspects of Two Thousand Six Hundred Years of Japanese History), in *Shūhō* (Weekly Gazette), February 7, 1940 (published by the Japanese government, Department of Home Affairs) p. 46.

and in a sense it is still, at the present time, a family life on a national scale.

This unified relationship based on the family has its origin in the ancient clan system of Japan. According to two ancient compilations in which myths, legends, and history are blended—the *Kojiki* (Record of Ancient Things), of 712 A.D., and *Nihongi* (more correctly called the *Nippon-shoki*, or Chronicles of Japan), of 720 A.D.—the ancient society of Japan was composed of various clans. Order was maintained and the group controlled by either the norms of the group or the commands of the *uji-no-kami*, or clan leader, who carried out his responsibilities under the supervision of the *ujigami*, or patron god of the clan. As the upholder of social customs, the clan chief exercised absolute power over clan members. This position was transmitted on an hereditary basis through the eldest son, since it was believed that only the descendants of the clan leaders could receive inspiration from the patron god.¹¹

The customary patriarchal family life inside this clan structure differs from family life in the West. Western family life is of the conjugal type. Under its pattern, children, when they grow up and marry, leave the parents' home and set up their own households. There is no inheritance of the headship of the family. It is a social system based on individual personality. The Japanese family, on the other hand, is based, through the ancestor god-agent, on a vertical relationship between parent and child, and thus between ancestors and their descendants. The husband is the head not only of the *Honke*, or principal immediate family, but also of all *Bunke*, or branch families and allied relatives. With him in the household live his wife, their children (and perhaps the wife and children of his eldest son), possibly his brothers and sisters, and sometimes his uncles and aunts; the group may also include his aged parents, for under a system known as *sozokusei*, or the transferring of hereditary rights, a father may

¹¹ See Y. Horie, "The Life Structure of the Japanese People in its Historical Aspects," in *Kyoto University Economic Review*, vol. 21 (April 1951) pp. 1-22.

become a *goinkyō* (honorable old man) and retire from the headship of the family in his old age, being succeeded by his eldest son. The life of this whole household group is subject to the control of the head, and when the heir of the household grows up he inherits the family as well as the powers of the head.

Thus the head of the customary Japanese family is not simply the head in the usual sense: he is the current manifestation of the ancestor god. The family members do not look upon themselves as being subject to the control of a mere mortal head of the family; rather they consider themselves to be under the control of the family itself, as embodied in the head. In addition, the head of the family himself does not exist for his personal development: he manages the family affairs in the interest of the family. Both the head and the members submerge themselves in the family, and the individual personality is minimized.¹²

In Japan this idea of family life functions on a national scale, and is in fact the national life of the country. Each family head is in a sense a miniature emperor, and an extension of the dynastic

¹² Increasing research is being done on the Japanese family. Systematic treatments are to be found in the following: Hisatoshi Tanabe, editor, *Shakaigaku Taikei* (Systematic Sociology), vol. 1 (Tokyo 1948), especially the sections by Teizō Koyama on "Kazoku no Kosei to Kinō" (The Structure and Function of the Family), pp. 10-56, by Takashi Koyama on "Nihon Kindai Kazoku" (The Modern Japanese Family), pp. 151-94, and by Zennosuke Nakagawa on "Kazoku Seido" (The Family Institution), pp. 195-239; Seiichi Kitano, "Koshu Sanson no Dozoku Soshiki to Oyakatta-Kokatta Kanko" (Kinship Group Organization and Fictitious Parent-Child Relationship), in *Minzokugaku Nempo* (Annals of Ethnology), vols. 2 and 3 (Tokyo 1940-41); Seiichi Kitano, "Dozoku Soshiki to Hoken-isei" (Kinship Group Organization and Remnants of Feudalism), and Tadashi Fukutake, "Kazoku no okeru Hoken-isei" (Remnants of Feudalism in the Family), both in *Hoken-isei* (Remnants of Feudalism), published by the Nippon Jinbun Kagaku Kaihen (Japanese Society of Ethnology) (Tokyo 1951); Kizaemon Aruga, *Nihon Kazoku-seido to Kosaku* (Japanese Family Institution and Tenant System) (Tokyo 1943); Kizaemon Aruga, "Dozoku to Shinzoku" (Kinship Group and Kin), in *Yanagida, Kunio Sensei Koki Kinen Rombunshu* (A Collection of Papers Commemorating the Seventy-Seventh Birthday of Kunio Yanagida), vol. 2 (Tokyo 1947); Takashi Nakano, "To-shi ni okeru Dozoku to Shinzoku" (Kinship Group and Kin in a City), in *Gendai Shakaigaku no Sho-Mondai* (Current Problems of Sociology) (Tokyo 1949); Takeichiro Fukuo, *Nippon Kazoku-shi* (History of the Japanese Family Institution) (Kyoto 1948).

Emperor. This idea is emphasized to each generation, and it is impressed on the individual that acquiring skill in family living amounts to the same thing as acquiring skill in national living. Thus down to the present Japan has managed her national life in accordance with the historical tradition of becoming habituated to a national life under the principle of *kokka*, or nationalism, or nation-family.¹³

This family-like organization has consistently been the basis of national life throughout Japan's history. The Emperor, therefore, is never a mere sovereign. He is the center and pinnacle of a structure of national life which possesses an historical tradition. In this sense his status differs from that of various European rulers in the past, who by virtue of strength rose out of a host of feudal lords to the position of king or dominant ruler. In Japan the Emperor was not the highest feudal lord; actually, he stood outside the feudal system. Even in the Tokugawa period the ruler-subject relationship which existed between the Emperor and the Shōgun was not merely that between a lord and a vassal, for the Shōguns were always conscious of the Emperor as spiritually their superior, by virtue of his descentance from Amaterasu-ōmikami; thus when the feudal system gave way before the Meiji Restoration, the right to rule could be returned to the Emperor without greatly changing the family-authority pattern.¹⁴ After the Restoration the ideals of national and family life, which had been strengthened under the feudal system, were not only retained but were accentuated even more strongly among the people, through various policies, educational procedures, and legislation.¹⁵

In this close relationship of people and Emperor one other

¹³ See Y. Horie (cited above, note 11) p. 5; Hajime Tamashiro, "Kazoku-seido" (The Family Institution), in *Keizaigaku Shōjiten* (Small Encyclopedia of Economics) (Tokyo 1950).

¹⁴ See Sansom (cited above, note 8) pp. 270-71, 444; K. Maki, *Nippon Hoseishi Gairon* (An Outline of Legislation History of Japan) (Tokyo 1935) p. 185.

¹⁵ See Chitoshi Yanaga (cited above, note 1), Chapter 7, "Reorganization of Education," pp. 100-11; Shōzō Kōno, *Jingishi Gaiyō* (An Outline of Shinto History) (Tokyo 1927) pp. 143-44; Asaga Tetsujirō, *Nihon Kyōiku no Kaiko to Sono Shōrai* (Japanese Education, Past and Future) (Tokyo 1936).

factor of importance is the role that the village plays in Japanese life.¹⁶ More than half of the total population resides in villages or village-towns. Although Japan is considered an industrial nation, industry is still subordinate to farming, fishing, and forestry in the economy; and the cities and urban areas are largely merely expanded villages, which, even though changed physically and altered in their political and economic relations, still retain much of the rustic spirit and culture pattern carried over from the feudal age.¹⁷ The role of the village persists—the village as a family-racial-territorial group situated in a fixed ancestral locality and united around rituals for the clan god. The village of patriarchal-type families has, itself, a family-like structure; and it is the worship of the clan god which constitutes the core of its consanguinal and territorial unity. And these gods are all related to the Emperor's ancestral Amaterasu-ōmikami.

The situation just examined is fundamental in any attempt to understand the relationship of the Emperor to the structure of Japanese society or to comprehend social-political trends in contemporary Japan. A new pattern of life was introduced into the country during the six and one-half years of occupation, yet there is still a deep belief in the continued descendance of the Emperor and the head of the family from the ancestral gods, and in the existence of the dead in the spirit world, and even where this belief is absent, custom is strong. The culture of Japan has a

¹⁶ See Eitaro Suzuki, "Wagakuni ni okeru Nōson-shakaishudan no chiikisei ni tsuite" (On the Territorial Character of the Village Communities in Japan), in *Kazoku to Sonraku* (Family and Village), vol. 1 (Tokyo 1939); N. Nishida, "Nippon Shakai Shichō" (Trend of Social Thought in Japan), in *Sekai Shichō* (World Intellectual Trend), vol. 2 (Tokyo 1930); Mitsuo Shimidzu, *Nippon Chusei no Sonraku* (Villages in Medieval Japan) (Tokyo 1942); K. Maki, "Chusei Makki no okeru Somura Kannen no Seiritsu" (Rise of the "Whole Village" Idea in the Late Medieval Period), in *Keizaishi Kenkyū* (History of Economic Thought), vol. 16 (Tokyo 1936); Yasoji Kazahaya, Explanatory Note in *Zenkoku Minji Kanrei Ruishu* (Japanese Civil Law: A Collection of Cases, Usages, and Practice) (Tokyo 1942) p. 7.

¹⁷ See Arthur F. Raper et al., General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, *The Japanese Village in Transition* (Tokyo: SCAP, Natural Resources Section, Report No. 136, 1950) pp. 35, 37, and especially Part II, "Recent Changes in Village Life," pp. 53-102; also Horie (cited above, note 11) pp. 13-19.

history that officially goes back for twenty-six hundred years. During this entire time some type of authoritarianism has been a basic principle of national life, with the Emperor, of course, either directly exercising the power to rule or standing in such a position that he still remained the outward sign and symbol of authority, as in the Tokugawa period.

The fact that this particular social configuration has roots of such tremendous depth should be kept in mind in trying to comprehend Japanese resistance to a change in the Emperor system. In view of the system's deep-rooted strength it is not such an anomaly as it seems that there are efforts to retain it in some form, even within a new Japan emerging under a new social pattern—efforts to strengthen and support the traditional structure even in political and educational policies predicated upon a democratic foundation.

COMMENT ON LOWE'S "MECHANISTIC APPROACH"¹

UPON the internal evidence of his own argument, Adolph Lowe has taken the science of economics far beyond the hypotheses of classical mechanics, and yet maintains that his science is still mechanistic, and must be mechanistic, in its approach—at least “for understanding a competitive economic society” (p. 403). This self-deception within his argument results neither from a misunderstanding of what is mechanistic nor from any indifference to the methodological nature of his own science, but, it seems to me, simply from the natural ambiguity of all analogous reasoning from one area of inquiry into another.

Dr. Lowe is correct in maintaining that the basic hypothesis of classical mechanics (which also underlies, as he says, traditional economics) is that “the state of any ‘whole’ or ‘aggregate’ can be derived from the calculable behavior of its particles” (p. 403). What Dr. Lowe nowhere indicates is precisely how *contemporary* physics, and (I contend) contemporary economics also, has found it necessary to depart from this mechanical hypothesis. It is to be taken as the fundamental distinction between the classical mechanistic mode of thinking and the contemporary non-mechanistic approach that the mechanical hypothesis has, precisely, been overturned; so that physicists today (and economists also) are found to be operating on the principle that while the behavior of any specific particle is not calculable, the aggregate behavior of any group of particles *is* calculable, according to methods of statistical analysis. In physics, this can be illustrated from the law for the rate of radioactive disintegration of radium, where it is known with some degree of probability how many atoms will disintegrate during any time period, but where (in the words of Einstein and Infeld) “. . . we have no power to designate the individual atoms condemned to disintegration. . . . There is not the slightest trace of a law governing their individual behavior.”²

Now, what made traditional economics mechanistic was, in Dr. Lowe's words, its “assumption of a universal motive force, the profit incentive” (p. 405). Classical economics assumed the operation of the profit motive as an almost unconditioned force in economic life, in

¹ Adolph Lowe, “On the Mechanistic Approach in Economics,” in *Social Research*, vol. 18 (December 1951) pp. 403-34; page citations in the subsequent text are in reference to this article.

² *The Evolution of Physics* (New York 1938) p. 300.

much the same way that Newtonian physics relied upon the law of gravitation for its inquiries into celestial mechanics. And, in the same way that Einsteinian physics has been unable to dispense with the law of gravitation, while building the science far beyond it, so contemporary economics cannot dispense with the profit principle, although in demonstrating the conditions of its operation it has developed a "revised mechanistic approach" (p. 432) which to my mind is revised clean beyond mechanism.

What has revised economic science essentially is the concern for process analysis, which was found to be impossible on the basis of traditional price theory. It has been found necessary to introduce into analysis an additional complex—of "expectations"—in order to account for cognitive behavior in the economic world (p. 423). The suspicion is at least plausible that this was done with some cognizance of quantum mechanics (which, of course, is not "mechanistic" in the sense in which Dr. Lowe uses this word), where *expectation values* are calculated, and not uniquely, as in classical (mechanistic) mechanics, "exact" coordinates of position and velocity. "The possibility of calculating expectation values is very important for the quantum mechanics, since we can now make assertions as to what values we can expect to find on the average for a system in a given state, even though we can no longer make all the assertions as to exact values which were thought possible in the classical mechanics."³ It is true that in economic analysis the term "expectations" has reference to the *observable* characteristics of market behavior, while in physical analysis it is the calculable mean value of the *observer's* measurements which is referred to; but this point does not disqualify my suspicion—it only indicates the direction in which it might be verified (and also something of the nature of that ambiguity of analogous reasoning which was previously mentioned). Whether or not our economists have learned from quantum theory, it is certain that Keynes intended his reconstruction of the science of economics to be recognized historically in analogy with the precedent removal of the problems of physics out of the realm of classical mechanics. His words are the equivalent of Einstein's in a not too dissimilar circumstance: "We are thus led to a more general theory, which includes the classical theory with which we are familiar, as a special case."⁴

³ Richard C. Tolman, *The Principles of Statistical Mechanics* (London 1938) pp. 208-09.

⁴ *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* (London 1936) p. vii. For physics the *special case* is of course the classical assumption of an inertial

The concept of expectations in economics is non-mechanistic in character, as the statements of Dr. Lowe concerning it will testify; for example: ". . . in a functioning market the typical influences on expectations must prevail over the accidental ones. This consideration will never yield a prediction, however guarded, for any individual case, but it will give us a clue to the expectational conditions upon which the continuity of provision depends" (p. 425). The methodological assumption to be made here is that while the profit motive does naively lend itself to the mechanistic approach, expectational behavior never does—so that economic science, when it undertakes the analysis of expectations, has in fact already abandoned the mechanistic approach.

It is true that Dr. Lowe carries through what remains for him a "mechanistic" analysis by determining how expectations are influenced. He finds this influence in what he calls "the prevailing structure, or degree of mobility" (p. 428)—that is, the capacity of any enterprise to adjust to changes in the economic process. But the words in which Dr. Lowe describes this capacity are the words not of a mechanistic but of a statistical methodologist: "Under conditions of near-perfect mobility the possible speed and adaptability of any adjustment make it very *probable* that the present price-quantity level will persist until the adjustment is completed; it is equally *probable* that prices will fall once supply has caught up with demand" (p. 429; the italics are mine).

In short, Dr. Lowe's conception of the influence of structure on expectations has a statistical, probability value, and is, like the concept of expectations itself, non-mechanistic. That Dr. Lowe is not aware of what has happened to the methodological basis of his science is evident from the following summative statement (p. 432, italics again mine): "It is the variety of possible structures, operating through the medium of different expectations, which widens the range of *mechanisms* that are accessible to *exact* determination."

The loss of mechanical exactness (which was in any case illusory) is compensated for by the acquisition of whole new areas of inquiry, and by the consequent gain in pragmatic reliability—which is only a methodologically more precise way of saying what Dr. Lowe has already said. The reason for this methodological precision is that it enables us to envision the limits and at the same time the powers

system in which alone the mechanical laws are held to be valid; in economics the special case is the equally unreal assumption of unrestricted competition as a system in which the laws of supply and demand are uniformly valid.

of economic science. For the contemporary approach in economics has become non-mechanistic, not in the manner of relativity and quantum physics, that is, not by critically overcoming the limitations of mechanism, but by being presented within its own terms with problems which offered nothing but non-mechanistic solutions; in other words, the mechanistic approach in economics has through its own efforts outgrown itself. The realization of this *self-transcendence* in method ought to lead economists toward concern for some of the problems which mechanism has traditionally been unable to cope with, and which have been almost universally declared to be outside the scope of the science (mainly because its vision *has* been tied to the mechanistic approach)—problems of valuation, especially the problem of the relationship, in any possible economic system, of productive necessity to human freedom (a problem concerning which, by the way, there are, for the two systems of economic behavior most familiar to us, many important implications to be found in Dr. Lowe's essay).

A final note needs to be added from the fact that I have, throughout these paragraphs, and in a thoroughly reckless fashion, been reasoning analogously from physics to economics and vice versa. It is this: analogy does not support the argument that economics should be built on the model of successes in physics, and still less does it imply the reduction of one science to another; analogy, model validation, and reduction are logically disparate modes of reasoning.

JAMES PARSONS

REJOINDER

IF I read Mr. Parsons' comments correctly he finds himself more or less in agreement with the substantive statements contained in the article to which he refers. What he objects to is the label "mechanistic," which I have attached to the model of a functioning market process expounded there. And as I understand him, he bases his

critique on the fact that I have found myself compelled to introduce "probabilistic" elements into an analysis which started out from "causal determinateness."

It would be easy for me to evade the issue by simply pointing to the many occasions in the history of science when the concept of "mechanism" was used in the same wider sense in which I used it, including both "causal" and "statistical" laws—for instance in the controversy about the "mechanistic" or "organistic" nature of the world. And I could point to the fact that in some rather advanced quarters of modern physics, represented by Einstein and Planck, statistical laws are regarded as no more than a preliminary stage of knowledge, to be superseded in good time by the discovery of the causes which determine the behavior even of individual atoms. I might clinch my argument by pointing to the "micro-economic" foundations of all macro-economics—an indication that economists may even be ahead of their physicist brethren in tracing the path of their atoms.

But I share Mr. Parsons' concern about the dangers of analogical thinking, and I agree with him that one should state unambiguously, though not necessarily in a formal definition, what meaning one wants to give to a term borrowed from another branch of science. While readily admitting that I might have done better in the article referred to, I shall now try to say explicitly why I think that the traditional model of market analysis, as well as the modified one that I have presented, is conveniently labelled "mechanistic."

Mr. Parsons can hardly have failed to recognize that the ultimate purpose of my paper is "apologetic." It tries to defend the traditional method of economic analysis against the two-front attack to which it is at present exposed. One opponent, not directly mentioned in the article, is the growing body of "practical" economists who once again look at the achievements of "theory" with skepticism if not with contempt.

The very fact that crusades against "lack of realism" in traditional analysis have recurred in regular cycles, since the days of the historical school, must make us wonder whether all is well with the inherited procedure. I have left no doubt where my sympathies lie when the formalistic subjectivism which underlies so much of neoclassical economics is exposed, and the demand is raised for a more substantive treatment of economic behavior. But it seems to me that the answer should be sought in the direction of classical vector analysis which, however crude, contains the clue to a testable theory of economic

behavior, rather than in the substitution of empirical sociology and psychology for economic theory. And this all the more so since classical analysis can easily be refined by integrating it with a theory of expectations, if, and indeed only if, we succeed in tracing this most volatile "cause" of economic behavior to objective factors.

Now the mechanistic analogy, which Mr. Parsons admits for the classical procedure, seems to me still appropriate to my general scheme of such a revised theory, and this for two reasons. First, the central problem of market analysis is still how the state of the whole can be derived from the behavior of the particles. Admittedly it cannot be derived from the behavior of any one particle selected at random, since the market, like any macro system, has a certain tolerance for "unsystematic" behavior. But neither—and this seems to me crucial—can arbitrary behavior of any number of particles be permitted. If I may take the risk of introducing another analogy from physics, the structure of a functioning market resembles Boltzmann's postulate that in a given aggregate the number of particles carrying a definite amount of energy depends upon the percentage by which this energy differs from the average value. In other words, we cannot know a priori whether a particular marketer conforms to the "code of behavior" of a functioning market; but we can form a notion of the limit of tolerance of different market structures, and thus of the size and strength of the individual deviations admissible.

The second reason why the concept of "mechanism" seems to me useful as a criterion for my revision of the classical procedure can best be explained if I now turn to the second front on which traditional analysis is engaged. This is the discussion on the theory of games, to which my paper refers at the beginning and also at the end.

What is at stake has been very well stated by Professor Morgenstern in reference to bilateral monopoly. There the fundamental fact is that "while each of the participants wishes to maximize his own gain, *the problem as a whole is not a maximum problem.*"¹ The theory of games has been devised to cope with a number of cases which cannot be solved by a maximum-minimum calculation in the usual sense, and its great merit rests in the fact that it has discovered determinate solutions for some such cases, where the sociological economists had to content themselves with casuistic descriptions and—very risky—statistical gen-

¹ See Papers and Proceedings of the Sixtieth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, *American Economic Review*, vol. 38, no. 2 (May 1948) p. 12; italics mine.

eralizations. My doubts arise when this novel method, full of promise in "partial equilibrium" analysis, is advocated as a substitute for general equilibrium analysis, understood as a maximum problem of the "whole." Here again a revised version of the classical maximum-minimum analysis, and thus a genuinely mechanistic postulate, seems to me a safer guide when the conditions for the proper functioning of the market through time are to be discovered.

So much on the problems of substance. For the rest, our controversy seems to me semantic. But even as such, it should not be dismissed lightly. The article under discussion is part of a chapter in a forthcoming larger publication. Mr. Parsons' comments will certainly cause me to reexamine my terminology before the final version of the chapter in question goes to print.

ADOLPH LOWE

COMMENT ON LOWE'S "STRUCTURAL MODEL"¹

IN MY judgment Adolph Lowe's article on "A Structural Model of Production" represents a very real contribution to the theory of economic dynamics. His attempt to break down the aggregates of the circular flow into meaningful parts, and to establish quantitative relationships among those parts, should prove very fruitful.

In this note I want to quarrel with respect to an issue that I believe is not very important, and particularly not very relevant to Lowe's topic. But in view of the emphasis Lowe puts on this issue I would like to comment on it. It relates to statements made by me and others that the gross national product—GNP—contains an element of double counting. He contends that "one glance at our schema shows, however, that this is not so." I did glance at Lowe's schema, and still believe that GNP involves some double counting.

The gross national product consists of all production of consumer goods and producer goods and services. Raw materials and semi-manufactured goods are excluded, because they are reflected in the value of the finished goods. But the only difference between raw materials and equipment is that raw materials are "used up" in one process of production, while equipment is "used up" in a number of processes. Both raw materials and equipment enter into the final product, and the costs of both are reflected in the price of the final product (except when sales are made at a loss). The price of a dress reflects the cost of cotton, and also of the gin, the spindles, the looms, the sewing machines used in the production of the dress, and also of the equipment used in the production of the gin, the spindles, the looms, the sewing machines, and the cost of the equipment used in the production of that equipment, and so forth.

To avoid double counting with respect to raw materials and semi-manufactured goods we must count either the "value added" at each stage of production or the full value of the finished products. In the same way, we must either include all equipment produced, but deduct at each stage the costs for wear and tear (depreciation), or use the value of the finished product but exclude equipment used for replacement purposes. The two methods would give us the same result only if actual replacements happened to be identical with

¹ Adolph Lowe, "A Structural Model of Production," in *Social Research*, vol. 19 (June 1952) pp. 135-76.

depreciation. In practice we cannot statistically separate equipment used for expansion from equipment used for replacement. Therefore the only feasible method is to include in the national product all equipment produced, but to deduct from the aggregate an allowance for depreciation (exactly like deducting from gross product the raw materials and semi-manufactured goods that are bought and used in production). By this method we obtain what has been called the net national product.

Lowe's defense of gross national product as against net national product is based on alleged insights gained from his schema. But I do not think the schema proves anything in this respect. To be sure, his equations (set 3) show that the same figure, which is the equivalent of the GNP, is obtained by adding up the right and the left sides. This, however, proves only that *if* there is double counting, it is reflected on both sides of the equations.

Lowe believes that one can drive the process of disaggregation further by also setting up equations for raw-material and semi-manufactured goods industries. Thus he obtains what he calls a "super gross national product." He states, however, that "the value sum of all the outputs in successive stages of production . . . indeed contains duplications in the proper sense of the word, if it is taken as a measure of productive activity" (p. 175). This is exactly my point. If I understand him correctly, Lowe states here that we should add that part of production of materials which is added to inventory or goods in process. This, however, has always been done in the computation of both the gross national product and the net national product. The duplication that results from adding final values of products of successive stages of production is the same kind of duplication which, I believe, is inherent in the double counting of replacement of producer goods and the depreciation component in the value of the final goods.

I am unable to understand Lowe's argument that use of the concept of net national product implies that "somewhere in the system goods are produced with labor and natural resources alone" (p. 174). I maintain that the net national product reflects the use of equipment at all stages of production, and does not imply that there are any stages in which no equipment is used.

It is true, as Lowe says, that the equipment entering into current production consists of machines produced in previous periods, and is not physically identical with the equipment currently produced to

take the place of worn-out equipment. The differences between physical wear and tear, bookkeeping depreciation, and actual replacement exist; but this is no reason for counting both the costs of wear and tear and the costs of equipment used for replacement of worn-out equipment.

Lowe suggests in his polemic with Kuznets that the use of both gross and net national product may be justified, depending on what is regarded as the "goal" of the economy. I agree with Lowe that our methods of measurement must be related to what we want to know, which in turn is related to what we regard as the objectives of economic activity. I do believe, however, that the difference between gross and net national product cannot be explained in this way. I think both undertake to measure the same thing.

Each of these measurements has some disadvantage. The use of net national product requires a refinement which, because of the doubtful character of the depreciation figures, introduces a possible source of error into the estimate. On the other hand, the double counting in gross national product may lead to distorted results in intertemporal and international comparisons if the proportion of depreciation to the GNP total differs substantially from case to case. In spite of the theoretical superiority of the net concept, for most practical purposes I would not be too much disturbed if we continued to use the gross national product. The decision as to whether gross or net national product should be used is largely a question of technical expediency, and not a question either of economic theory or of economic philosophy.

GERHARD COLM

REJOINDER

I AM grateful to Gerhard Colm for giving me another opportunity to clarify an issue which, as he rightly says, is in no way basic to the general argument of my paper, and yet appears to me a good illustration of its practical applicability. After studying his comments I

cannot help feeling that so far we have been talking at cross-purposes. I have tried to vindicate the conceptual "purity" of conventional GNP—gross national product—calculations, which I interpret as a measure of total activity on the part of all factors, prime and supplementary, applied over a given period. Colm denies such "purity," and insists that the GNP concept is marred by "double counting." He arrives at this conclusion because he is after a measure not of the aggregate activity of all factors, in the sense just defined, but of "value added." I am in full agreement with him that the concept of net national product—NNP—that is, the sum of consumer-goods output plus net investment, is traditionally used to measure such net activity. Nevertheless, I shall try to show that, as a theoretical concept of "value added," this traditional definition of NNP is open to the very criticism Colm raises against the GNP concept. But this criticism itself is due to the fact that Colm wants GNP to measure what NNP tries to measure, while indeed GNP measures something else.

In order to disentangle the many crossing threads of thought I should like to reduce the problem to its simplest denominator. I contemplate a closed economic system with free natural resources, in which labor and real capital (fixed and working capital) are the only priced factors. At a certain moment, given quantities of stocks of these factors are distributed over the firms of the system in the technically required combinations. We wish to measure the result of their productive activity over a year.

There are many aspects of this productive result in which we can be interested, and different measures attach to different aspects. I propose to consider three such aspects.

The first is the one in which Colm is interested, that is, the "value added," or the net results of the period's activity. Here my assertion is that the conventional concept of NNP is a rather dubious measure if we take the notion of "netting" seriously. We cannot speak of "value added" unless we know to what preexisting magnitude we want to "add" something. This preexisting magnitude can be only the stock of material wealth that is at our disposal when activity starts. "Value added" thus claims to measure the accretions to wealth. Or, as we can also say, it has to answer the question by how much the economic potential of the original stocks of labor and equipment has been altered over the contemplated period.

The answer is simple for real capital goods—at least conceptually, though, as Colm rightly points out, not statistically. Output of real capital goods minus depreciation and depletion of the preexisting

stock of such goods yields the proper measure, which we call net investment. The answer is a little less obvious if we consider our stock of human capital. But we have only to interpret part of current consumption as "replacement" of the current "wear and tear" of the working population, to realize that in the output of consumer goods we have a measure from which we can derive changes in the economic potential of our stock of labor.

It is clear from what was just said that we should not take the total annual output of consumer goods as a measure of such change. Since part of it serves to replace worn-out labor, only that amount of consumer-goods output should be counted here which exceeds the "cultural minimum of existence" prevailing. The reader will notice that I am restating the classical concept of "net produce" which, with its counterpart of "profit" on the income side, tried to express the true net achievements of economic activity after deduction of both the human and the instrumental wear and tear. I regard this concept as the only "pure" *net* expression of productive activity. By including total consumer-goods output, the conventional concept of NNP certainly performs double counting of the same kind for which Colm criticizes the concept of GNP: it contains an item which serves the maintenance rather than the change of the stock in question. I fully realize the statistical difficulties in separating the replacement part of consumer-goods output from the accretion part, and I am willing to compromise on the practical level. But if Colm claims for the conventional definition of NNP conceptual purity as a measure of "value added," the above criticism has to be raised.

In the abstract, however, the customary measure of NNP is not "wrong" or "distorted by double counting." The verdict depends exclusively on the interpretation we give to the result. NNP is a perfect measure if understood as the goods equivalent of the aggregate income of prime factors, that is, workers and property owners. It shows what goes to the disposal of householders over the course of the year, either in the form of consumer goods or—via saving and investment—in the form of additions to their material wealth. And this would be a second question we might ask regarding productive activity.

Now I maintain that a third question can be asked, and that the answer to it is given by the GNP concept. The question is concerned with a value expression of the total activity performed over the period by all factors, labor and equipment, which are given at the initial point of time. The purpose of such activity—whether

it is devoted to change or to maintenance—is immaterial for this measure. The gross output value thus arrived at is the equivalent of all inputs of labor and equipment, each of which is counted only once.

It is this fact which the “schema of production,” as presented in my paper, demonstrates in my opinion more clearly than any verbal exposition can do. Certainly we would have double counting were we to use this measure as an expression of change. But in my remarks directed to Kuznets, to which Colm refers, I made it abundantly clear that GNP is to be regarded as a measure of aggregate effort, and not of net changes of factor stocks. And I do not see how anyone can deny that, while the efforts of some units of labor and equipment produce consumer goods, other units of labor and equipment spend effort, side by side and simultaneously with the former units, on producing the equipment goods necessary to replace the wear and tear suffered by both groups during the course of the same period.

But indeed I have gone further in my paper, by extending to “working” capital, in the sense of goods in progress, the same logic that the GNP concept applies to the initial stocks of fixed and “human” capital. There is no theoretical justification for excluding the efforts devoted to the maintenance of the initial stock of working capital from the measure of aggregate activity. In this respect the conventional calculations of GNP are incomplete, and—at least in the interest of conceptual clarity—need supplementation. This is the reason for my suggestion of a “super-GNP,” which gives a complete account of all the efforts of all the factors, both prime and supplementary.

Colm has certainly misunderstood this notion if he interprets the difference between “super-GNP” and GNP as measuring the *addition* to inventory or to goods in process. This latter magnitude is part of net investment, and is indeed contained in both NNP and GNP. What I propose to count in this context is the effort bestowed in every stage of production on replacing those working-capital goods which “move forward” during the period considered. As is the case in the relation between fixed-capital goods and consumer goods, this activity directed to “remaking” unfinished goods occurs simultaneously with that devoted to making finished goods, and is not counted in the value sum of the latter.

Colm is right, on the other hand, that we must not include even in my “super-GNP” that part of the period output of cotton, yarn,

cloth, and the like which does appear in the finished product of the period. This would certainly be double counting, so long as we are after a measure of total *activity*. But what if we were once more to change the focus of interest, inquiring this time into the money value of total *transactions*? At once the aggregate, which from the aspect of activity contains double counting, becomes "pure." Or does Colm deny the concept of "transaction volume" a legitimate place in the theory of money?

Thus I would insist after all that economic theory has something to contribute to the clarification of the various "national product" concepts. Otherwise technical expediency, inevitable on the empirical-statistical level, will easily blind us to the meaning of the questions our figures are supposed to answer.

ADOLPH LOWE

BOOK REVIEWS

KOHLER, PHYLLIS PENN, editor and translator. *Journey for Our Time: The Journals of the Marquis de Custine*. [Introduction by Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith.] New York: Pellegrini & Cudahy. 1951. viii & 338 pp. \$4.

GURIAN, WALDEMAR, editor. *The Soviet Union. Background, Ideology, Reality: A Symposium*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. 1951. vii & 216 pp. \$3.50.

CARR, EDWARD HALLETT. *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*. Volume I: 1951; x & 430 pp.; \$5. Volume II: 1952; vii & 400 pp.; \$6. New York: Macmillan.

INKELES, ALEX. *Public Opinion in Soviet Russia: A Study in Mass Persuasion*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1950. xviii & 379 pp. \$5.

There is a growing tendency among current writers on the Soviet Union to explain its policies in terms of Russian pre-revolutionary history rather than as manifestations of communist philosophy and action: communism tends to become identified with Russia. This trend recalls in many ways the ill-advised attempt of former years to describe National Socialism as a German phenomenon pure and simple, deeply rooted in the remote as well as recent past of the German people. To be sure, a complete disregard of the national background would be even less justified in regard to Bolshevism than in regard to National Socialism. But we should no less beware of oversimplifying a complex relationship.

The journals of the Marquis de Custine, republished in this country in 1951 in a new edition and translation by Phyllis Penn Kohler, easily lend themselves to such oversimplification. Custine's memoirs of his hurried trip in 1839 through a part of imperial Russia are not free of mistakes and superficialities. Sober and shrewd observations on the nature of Russian society and state under Nicholas I are coupled with interpretations of the Russian national character that strike the judicious reader as somewhat audaciously divined. After all, Custine spent altogether only about four months in Russia, and did not know the native language. Moreover, the present abridged edition of his journals is intended to put in bold relief those comments of the Frenchman's that seem to be pertinent to our own experience

with communist Russia; the selection suggested by this purpose may not distort the factual picture that Custine drew of Czarist Russia under Nicholas I, but it is bound to strengthen the erroneous impression that the close resemblance of that picture to Russian public life under Stalin betokens permanent and indelible features of the Russian soul and mind.

The warning against such a rash conclusion, sounded by General Smith in his introduction, is therefore most appropriate. One wonders, however, whether it is emphatic enough. The decades following Custine's visit to Russia were to witness not only "the magnificent flowering of Russian culture and political philosophy," but the evolution of essential institutions of constitutional government as well. Thus even before the democratic revolution of February 1917 Russia had moved far away from the reign of Nicholas I, and was to revert to it only under Stalin. In fact, the reversion went beyond the "apogee" of imperial autocracy, as the period of Nicholas I has been called.

This is convincingly shown by Professor Karpovich in his paper on "The Historical Background of Soviet Thought Control," one of the contributions to the symposium on the Soviet Union edited by Professor Gurian. For this reason his paper serves as a welcome corrective of Custine's report of travels. As Karpovich mentions, even Alexander Herzen, who rebelled against the reign of Nicholas I, characterized that reign as "an amazing period of outward slavery and inner emancipation." Though it was "a time of strongest political reaction," says Karpovich, "it simultaneously was the most fruitful—or in some respects the most seminal—period in modern Russia's cultural and intellectual history." To be sure, the imperial government exercised a close and often harsh and stupid control over the spiritual life of its subjects. But this control was, on the whole, of a negative and repressive rather than of a directive nature. The state claimed and exercised broad powers for restraining society, but it did not try to absorb society. Czarist censorship, therefore, is hardly a sufficient explanation of the all-embracing system of thought control in present-day communist Russia.

Karpovich suggests that the historical roots of the latter should rather be sought in the revolutionary movement, with its ominous traits of maximalism, fanaticism, and authoritarianism. This explanation is valid as far as it goes, but it does not answer the question of what may account for the psychology and mentality of the revolutionary movement itself, a phenomenon so peculiar to nineteenth-

century Russia. In rejecting the tendency to interpret Bolshevism, its ideas as well as its institutions, exclusively in terms of the Russian national heritage, Karpovich has been tempted to go to the other extreme, and he looks askance at any explanatory reference even to what have always been considered constitutive historical elements of modern Russia, as for instance the Byzantine and Mongol legacy.

The reader who is especially interested in the problem of the permanency of national features throughout the Czarist and communist periods of Russian history will find a great deal to reflect on also in the analysis of the current state of religion in the Soviet Union, contained in Professor Timasheff's paper in the same volume, on "Religion in Russia, 1941-1950"—though the author himself refrains from engaging in any such speculations. The other contributors to this valuable symposium also confine themselves to scholarly discussions of current aspects of Soviet domestic and foreign politics.

The present two volumes of Carr's *History of Soviet Russia* form the first instalments of an ambitious project that is eventually to cover the whole initial period of the Soviet Union, up to 1928. The first three volumes are intended to carry the history of communist Russia approximately up to the time when Lenin withdrew from the scene and the struggle for power began. The rest of the work will deal with the struggle for power between 1923 and 1928. The first of the volumes so far published traces the history of the Marxist movement in pre-revolutionary Russia, the development of the Soviet constitutional structure, and the nationalities policy of the Soviets in Leninist Russia. The second volume is an analysis of Soviet economic policies in the months immediately following the seizure of power, in the period of war communism, and in the first part of the NEP period. The third volume, on communist Russia under Lenin, is to be published shortly and will deal with the foreign policy of that time.

In order to do justice to Carr's undertaking, we have to realize clearly its scope and its object according to the author's own plan. Since the work is not intended to be an etiology of the communist revolution, the periods of imperial Russia and the Russia of the February revolution fall outside its scope. Accordingly the first part—the only one that takes the reader back into the *ancien régime*—deals exclusively with the development of Marxist doctrine in Russia and with the formative period of the movements and parties based on it. Moreover, Carr's ambition has been, to quote the author him-

self, "to write the history not of the events of the revolution . . . but of the political, social and economic order which emerged from it." And finally, he has tried to convey to the reader "an imaginative understanding of the outlook and purpose" of the revolutionary protagonists, rather than to give a critical evaluation of their thought and action.

The attempt to portray the communist revolution as its principal agents conceived and acted it is entirely legitimate. One wonders, however, whether Carr always makes his limited objective sufficiently clear. What would be a correct statement of the Bolshevik view is sometimes presented with the pretentiousness of a final historical dictum. This tendency is found, for instance, in the condemnation of Menshevik determinism, in the characterization of the revolution of 1905 as a complete failure, and in the implicit attribution of validity to certain communist assertions concerning the nationalities policy of the regime. In these and other instances Carr's understanding of the Bolshevik position is sympathetic rather than merely imaginative.

To be sure, Carr is not a Marxist, and is even less a communist. But his generally benevolent attitude toward the October revolution is no doubt influenced by his conviction, stated in his book *The New Society*, that the future belongs to "the strong state exercising remedial and constructive functions." Moreover, as we know again from other studies by this prolific writer, Carr easily succumbs to the fascination of power pure and simple.

But be that as it may, Carr deserves the highest praise for the brilliance of his exposition and the lucidity of his style. The skill with which he has organized and presented the wealth of material into which he has been conscientiously digging is admirable. It is therefore a matter of great regret that he does not seem to contemplate also a further volume that would deal with the cultural history of Russia under Lenin.

Dr. Inkeles' present study is a detailed institutional analysis of the mechanisms through which the communist party in the Soviet Union is operating its domestic system of mass persuasion. It also throws interesting light on the content of Soviet propaganda and agitation, though it is in principle limited to a discussion of their various forms and of the various methods by which they are being conducted. Inkeles gives much more than a merely technical exposition. In an introductory chapter he acquaints the reader with communist theory on public opinion, and throughout the volume he relates the actual

functioning of the media of mass communication in the Soviet Union to the country's political, economic, and social system.

The bulk of the book deals with the Soviet press, domestic broadcasting in the USSR, and the film in Soviet society. But probably the main merit of Inkeles' study does not lie in its excellent description and analysis of these impersonal media of mass communication. Beyond that, it reveals the great extent to which the Soviet leaders are fostering and relying on "daily face-to-face contact between the masses and representatives of the party, as a fundamental instrument of public communication and as a method of influencing opinions and shaping attitudes." Personal oral agitation and the Bolshevik agitator, its instrument, emerge from the pages of this book for the first time in their full significance for the operation of the Soviet government. The degree of differentiation, professional and geographical, in the content of propaganda and agitation in general is, according to Inkeles, higher than is usually assumed.

No less valuable is the author's judicious examination of the manner and functions of "self-criticism." To be sure, it operates "within carefully defined limits which considerably restrict the scope of its impact as a democratic force in soviet society." All the same, the institution is a clear indication that the channels of communication between party and people are not exclusively one-way streets. And equally well-balanced is Inkeles' judgment on the effectiveness of the Soviet policies of mass persuasion.

ERICH HULA

HAMBURGER, MAX. *Morals and Law: The Growth of Aristotle's Legal Theory*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1951. xxii & 191 pp. \$3.75.

It is very difficult to write an adequate review of this book, because it tries to do so many different, though somewhat related, things at the same time. In an admirable foreword H. Cairns points out that for a long time the prevailing tendency has been to consider analytical jurisprudence a self-sufficient and self-contained discipline, but that we can no longer close our eyes to the fact that the science of law cannot be completely divorced from ethics, political science, and philosophy in general if it is not to become sterile. He expresses the opinion that Aristotle has done much to elucidate the interrelation between these different fields of inquiry, and that his works on ethics and politics are therefore still worthy of the attention of the legal philosopher and the jurist.

With all this one can emphatically agree, and for this reason a book by a jurist and philosopher of law dealing with the elements of legal theory contained in Aristotle's works is certainly to be welcomed. The author of the present volume is not, however, content to point out and interpret the relevant passages in Aristotle and to show what we can learn from them, or in what way they may have influenced later legal theories, especially those of the Romans. As the subtitle of his book indicates, he wants, in addition, to show how Aristotle's legal thinking grew and developed. This also is certainly a most interesting and worthwhile task, but a very difficult one, especially if one attempts not only to show how Aristotle's thought grew out of and beyond that of his predecessors, but also to follow its various steps within the development of Aristotle himself—for this presupposes a knowledge of which of the works attributed to Aristotle are genuine, and in what sequence they were written.

This is a most controversial question. For a long time only the so-called Nicomachean Ethics (NE) were acknowledged as a work of Aristotle's. In more recent years most competent scholars have come to agree that the so-called Eudemian Ethics (EE) are also Aristotle's, and that this work was written earlier than the Nicomachean Ethics, the latter being the expression of Aristotle's most mature thought. But in regard to the third ethical work attributed to Aristotle, the so-called *Magna Moralia* (MM), the controversy is still raging. Some scholars, following the lead of the late H. von Arnim, consider it a genuine work of Aristotle's and the earliest of those extant, while others, of whom W. W. Jaeger is the most famous, have contended that it was written after Aristotle's death, probably by a member of the peripatetic school of the time of Theophrastus. Recently an attempt has been made to prove that it was written as late as the second century B.C.

The author of the present work tries to revive H. von Arnim's thesis and to support it with new arguments. He emphasizes this point so much as to make everything else in the greater part of his book subservient to this particular inquiry. In the opinion of the reviewer this is most unfortunate. A reader primarily interested in the interrelations between morals and law, or in Aristotle's contribution to legal philosophy, is not likely to have the time, and will probably lack the necessary philological training, for an evaluation of the author's arguments. If he has a critical mind he will therefore be left with the uneasy feeling that he has to accept the author's conclusions more or less on faith: to check them would require a

constant going back and forth between the parallel passages in the original text of Aristotle's three ethical works, plus a careful study of the earlier literature—a very laborious task indeed.

I have undertaken this task for two of the three chapters in which the author deals with the problem mentioned, and I did not find his method in these two chapters fully adequate, quite apart from the fact that he certainly does Jaeger and his successors less than justice. Jaeger, in his famous book on Aristotle, did not enter on any major discussion of the MM problem at all, but merely in one sentence expressed the opinion (p. 237) that the MM "was an extract from the two other ethical works of Aristotle written by a peripatetic who wished to write a short manual for his lectures." Everyone who has found it necessary, while writing a book on a major subject, to refer to some complicated but marginal problem that cannot be dealt with in detail but cannot remain unmentioned either, knows how difficult it is to describe such a problem, or its solution, accurately in a few words. It is therefore not surprising that Jaeger's formulation was not quite perfect. Since then, however, the formulation has been modified and corrected in a number of contributions, most important of which are a long and penetrating review of Arnim's work on the subject by E. Kapp (in *Gnomon*, 1927) and the extensive book on the MM by Jaeger's disciple, R. Walzer (*Neue philologische Untersuchungen*, vol. 7). Nevertheless a considerable number of Dr. Hamburger's arguments apply only to Jaeger's formulation taken in its most literal sense, and not at all to the thesis as formulated in these later works—as for instance when he continually points out that the author of the MM did not always choose the shorter of the two formulations of a problem to be found in Aristotle's two other ethical works, and therefore cannot have wanted to write "a short manual."

To be sure, there are a number of arguments by which Dr. Hamburger tries to show that the MM must be earlier because it still uses formulas or distinctions which had been current before Aristotle, or as far back as the fifth century B.C., and in which Aristotle was no longer interested in his later years. Such arguments are of course still more difficult to check, especially since the author does not enumerate the passages that would prove or tend to prove that these formulas had been current at the time indicated. I have not had the time to check all of these arguments, but where I did check them I have not found them confirmed by the evidence. The author argues, for instance, that the same distinction between *bia* and *anángke* that is found in the MM, but not in Aristotle's other ethical writings, was

"current among the sophists of the fifth century" (p. 22). I have not been able to find the passages on which he bases his statement. But even if there is such a passage, or passages—there certainly cannot be many—it is hardly possible to say that the distinction in this sense was "current" among the sophists of the fifth century, for if that had been the case the orator Antiphon, as the foremost legalist of the time, would certainly have made it, and he uses the two words absolutely promiscuously. What Dr. Hamburger says (p. 54) about the distinction between the written and the unwritten law in the MM and the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* is even less well-founded, since this distinction is most conspicuously absent in the MM.

I am sorry to write at such length about this very special question. But I do not wish to say more than I can prove, and though I remain convinced, for the time being, by the arguments of Kapp and Walzer, I cannot demonstrate that Dr. Hamburger's thesis is wrong without having thoroughly checked every one of his arguments, a task that would require several weeks of continuous and intensive work. So much, however, I think I can say: that the average reader will have to accept on faith the author's conclusions regarding the MM, and I submit that therefore the author, if he wished to deal with this problem, would have done better to publish this investigation separately in a book for specialists, instead of making it the dominating factor in the composition of a book which, according to the title and the foreword, is designated to deal with an infinitely larger subject.

This suggestion, it seems to me, is all the more justified since the author's solution of the MM problem, even if accepted, does not appear to contribute very much that is essential for his main subject: while the differences between the EE and the NE are indeed most interesting, the MM in most of the cases, even in his judgment, is simply less clear, less profound, or, as he calls it, "less advanced."

There is only one exception to this, at least in Dr. Hamburger's opinion, and this one apparent exception seems to be the reason why he is so insistent that the MM must be a genuine work of Aristotle's. He regards the seventh chapter of the second book of the MM—in which the attempt is made to show that not reason, but the pleasure a person feels in doing what is right, is the true origin of moral virtue—as the crowning word of Peripatetic Ethics. Therefore, since the MM is the only one of the three works in which this statement occurs, it must in Dr. Hamburger's opinion have been written by Aristotle himself. But in this case it is particularly difficult to make the statement quoted by the author fit into a development which is supposed to

have started with the MM and ended with the NE, especially since, as Walzer has shown (*op. cit.*, pp. 99 ff.), the thesis mentioned is characteristic of the peripatetic school from Theophrastus onward, while in the EE and the NE, as the author himself points out, one looks in vain for such an extreme anti-Socratic, and anti-Stoic, formulation—though Aristotle discusses the importance both of the inborn character of a person and of training or acquired habits for a life of virtue, and at the end of the NE deals most thoroughly with the problem of pleasure.

But enough of this very special inquiry, which dominates the composition of the three main chapters of the book. It would be most unjust not to mention that these chapters contain a great many interesting discussions and observations that are largely independent of the evaluation of the MM. This is especially the case with the first of these chapters, which deals with "voluntary action and choice." Here it is shown how the theory of subjective responsibility which Aristotle developed in the course of his ethical analysis was most important for legal theory, since it made it possible to define much more clearly in what cases a man should be acquitted in spite of the fact that he may objectively have violated the law, and also to distinguish between different degrees of culpability.

The second main chapter, "on law and justice," which deals with Aristotle's distinctions between different types of justice, and especially with his theory of equity, is somewhat less satisfactory. It has now been fashionable for some time to consider the Greek sophists of the fifth century the true representatives of "progress," and to credit them with all sorts of "advanced" and highly acceptable theories. This fashionable view may or may not be correct. But to quote as a clear definition of the "functional side of equity," and of legal progress through the recognition of equity, the following lines from Aristophanes

Well, was not he who made the law a man, a mortal man
As you or I, who in old times talked over all the crowd?
And think you that to you or me the same is not allowed
To change it . . .

—to quote up to this point and to keep the reader in complete ignorance of the fact that the last line, of which only the first words are quoted, goes on "so that it permits the son to beat his father" (*Clouds*, 1424)—appears to be a little less than honest in presenting the evidence. This is especially striking since the author does not

say where in Aristophanes' *Clouds* the passage can be found, and even makes it difficult for the reader to find it, through creating the impression that it is spoken by the Adikos Logos, while it actually occurs in a scene in which the latter is no longer present on the stage.

Aristophanes may of course have misrepresented the theory and the aims of the sophists, as he certainly misrepresented Socrates. But his interpretation presents a problem. The realization that positive law is made by man and can be changed by man *may*, it is true, be used to change the law and to permit exceptions from the literal application of existing law, both with a view to greater equity. But it can also be used to justify any kind of arbitrariness, both in the making of laws and in their application; and recent experiences with totalitarian regimes should by now have opened everybody's eyes to the dangers of extreme functionalism in legal theory. Such dangers were pointed out by Plato and Aristotle, while Aristophanes was more concerned with the way in which the theory of the sophists might be used by tricky lawyers. It might therefore have been worth while to consider the problem of why Aristotle, who in the author's opinion made the greatest contribution among the Greek philosophers to the theory of equity, did not, as the author himself points out, like the sophists. On the other hand, the same chapter contains an able and instructive continuation of the inquiry into the principles by which Aristotle tries to distinguish different degrees of culpability.

The third chapter deals with Aristotle's theory of friendship and with the interrelations, in Aristotle's theory, between friendship in the widest sense and justice, as the two bonds which hold any human community of any kind together. A final chapter, with the title "Summary," tries to show what part Aristotle's theories of the mean, of friendship, and of equity played in post-Aristotelian jurisprudence; and a "Conclusion" sums up the main points made in the preceding parts of the book. These parts are necessarily very sketchy, but they give an impressive picture of Aristotle's importance for the development of legal thought. One can agree with the judgment of Dr. Cairns that the work under review is a valuable addition to a neglected field, and that the author has performed a substantial service for American legal thought—even though one may regret that he devoted much too great a part of his book to the solution of a very special problem which cannot be solved in this way, and which will hardly be of very great interest to the majority of his readers.

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HERZ, JOHN H. *Political Realism and Political Idealism: A Study in Theories and Realities*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1951. xii & 275 pp. \$3.75.

This book is an attempt to study politics in terms of recurrent or persuasive types of political thinking. John H. Herz classifies our intellectual heritage of political thought into political idealism and political realism. In fact, he says (p. 17) that "political thought itself may be reduced to two main 'ideal types': a political realism which has regard for those "security and power factors inherent in human society"; and a political idealism which does not take account of those factors, or does so in a perfunctory way. After a discussion of these "ideal types," in which the author enlists himself generally on the side of political realism, he suggests that a solution may be found in what he calls "realist liberalism" (pp. 131-132). The solution is "realist" in that it recognizes trends in directions natural to passionate man, and "liberal" in that it tries to push man in a different direction (pp. 131, 249). An acceptance of Herz's realist liberalism requires, the author suggests, the knowledge that "liberalism" is "anti-natural," quoting Ortega y Gasset (p. 137), and, in fact, that the "human" is anti-natural (p. 138).

In the course of Herz's analysis much is said about the reconcilability of generous political aims with common sense. That much is all to the good—serious, scholarly, well-documented. Indeed, a discussion of the perspective of "realist liberalism" occupies the greater part of the book. This reviewer, at least, finds much in that discussion with which he can sympathize, and which he can admire.

Unfortunately, however, the reader is asked to accept more than commonsense solutions of political problems. He is told first that all political thought can be classified in the convenient categories Herz has devised. But there is, in addition to the author's "realist liberalism," a great body of political thinking that is generous without being optimistic. The basis for Herz's classification is a psychological one: a contrast between "security and power feelings" and "sympathy feelings." With the first of these he associates Machiavelli and Mussolini, implying a kinship which may have been claimed by Mussolini but would never have been accepted by the Florentine republican. With the second he associates (p. 13) Robespierre, Mazzini, and Lincoln, or (p. 14) Robespierre, Mazzini, and Lenin. It should be clear that any classification of the history of political thought which puts Lenin in one group and Mussolini in another, which almost

substitutes Lincoln for Lenin, and which regards Machiavelli as one of those whose "power and security feelings" dominate their "sympathy feelings" tends to render the complex problems of political thought somewhat simpler than they actually are.

Indeed, the author goes farther. A failure to understand "power and security feelings," that is, human passions referred to by older writers as "vanity," "will to power," "fear of death," and the like, has, he contends, marked political idealism and led to "utopianism." Thus Herz can associate modern utopias and the "utopia" of Plato's *Republic* (pp. 45, 46) without discussing the purpose of Plato's *Republic*, and can refer to the notion that psychiatric experts should be given powers in the treatment of crime as "applied Platonism" (p. 167). As one who heartily endorses Herz's distinction between an ethic of responsibility and an ethic of principle (p. 143), and the Aristotelian preference he expresses for the former, I am deeply troubled that this distinction is not applied to political thinking itself. Had Plato, for example, paid as much attention to "power and security factors" as Herz (p. 35) says Marx did—in his insight, though not in his solution—Plato would have been guilty, as I think Marx was, of violating that very ethic of responsibility which Herz admires. Moreover, the very distinction between idealism and realism tends to break down when we consider that modern "utopianism," unlike that of Plato, comes not from raising the sights on man but from lowering them.

I have noted the psychological basis on which Herz rests his classification of political thought. It would be possible to show that these same psychological foundations, under different names, are partly responsible for the unrealistic character of modern "realism." The main difficulty, however, lies not in the psychological foundations themselves but in their parallel application to both political action and political science. The primary difference between one political teaching and another is not a psychological but a logical one, and a rational one. It is doubtless useful to understand human error in psychological terms, that is, in terms of the passions that produce error; but one must first know whether a teaching is true, that is, understand it in terms of reason. The truth cannot be understood simply by knowing that its discovery was motivated by a passion, even the passion for truth.

If, on the contrary, political thought may be reduced to the categories devised by Herz, the arguments for his own commonsense approach to modern political problems become somewhat less serious

than I think they are. When he points out that modern man has lost in actual autonomy (p. 231), or when he calls attention to the dangers in the polarization of power (p. 235), it seems to me that he says uncommonly good things. One may well ask why those good things should be vitiated by a fashionable but unproved subjectivism (pp. xi, 132). Indeed, the very assumption that the human is the anti-natural is derived from an assumption that the natural is the passion-oriented, a doubtful premise.

As I read this book, I reflected on what disservice has been done mankind by our use of the terms "idealism" and "realism." That is certainly not the fault of Herz, and he has every right to use those terms. But I wonder whether a greater refinement in political concepts would not come from the political writer's teaching man not how to use but how to abandon them.

HOWARD B. WHITE

STAMP, L. DUDLEY. *Land for Tomorrow: The Underdeveloped World*. Bloomington and New York: Indiana University Press and American Geographical Society. 1952. 230 pp. \$4.

DE CASTRO, JOSUÉ, with Foreword by Lord Boyd-Orr. *The Geography of Hunger*. Boston: Little, Brown. 1952. xii & 337 pp. \$4.50.

In 1798 Malthus published his famous pessimistic conclusions that unless the multiplication of the human species was checked by war, pestilence, or restrictions on propagation, mankind would soon be unable to raise sufficient food for itself. The facts of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have so far contradicted the learned minister. The world's population, estimated at 900 million in 1800, increased by 700 million in the next century, and by a further 750 million in the subsequent half-century, despite two bloody wars and the influenza epidemic of 1919. At this rate of increase, another 1,800 million will be added between 1950 and 2000. Can technical progress repeat the feat of the past hundred and fifty years, and raise the yield of the earth commensurate with, or even more than commensurate with, such increases in the numbers of mankind?

The two authors under review have examined this question with the help of the information available today. Professor Stamp is a British geographer, and adviser to many governments on the utilization of land. Professor de Castro is a Brazilian nutritionist, and chairman of the Executive Council of the Food and Agriculture Or-

ganization of the United Nations. Both experts are markedly influenced by the specific outlook of their respective sciences, as well as by their different national heritages, and their investigations follow entirely separate channels.

Stamp spent his early manhood in Burma, whence he returned to England with a conviction that a time might come when Britain could no longer rely on feeding its population from the proceeds of its international trade and its imperial and foreign revenues; in that eventuality the land of the British Isles would be its people's major asset. To prepare for this situation, Stamp recommended a survey of land utilization in Great Britain which would set standards for future development. He was able to find support for this plan, and by the beginning of World War II his survey was about complete. It proved of immediate value in the wartime drive for additional food production in the British Isles. Instead of supplying only one-third of British food requirements, the land of Britain produces today enough to cover about half the consumption of the increased number of inhabitants, without reducing average basic diets. In terms of yields per acre, British food production is today about the highest of any country in the world.

On the basis of this remarkable success, Stamp now uses the essentials of his survey methods to determine the number of people the land of other countries would be able to support if those countries achieved productivities per acre similar to those in Britain or other nations of comparable agricultural efficiency. Being primarily concerned with areas, Stamp ignores such considerations as output per man hour (in which the United States is far ahead of Britain), national and international trade, and social conditions. Also, he bases his calculations on the standard of food consumption of northwestern Europe today, which he describes as high.

On this basis, and taking into account only land reported as farmed at present, Stamp calculates that the land of the United States could feed 500 million people (instead of 150 million now inside the country, plus a few more million overseas); the Argentine 75 million (instead of 16 million or more); the Soviet Union 556 million (instead of about 200 million). On the other hand, he calculates that the land of Italy will be able to support only 38 million (instead of the present 46 million, at a lower standard of living and with the help of imports); England and Wales 24.5 million (the other 20 million now being fed by imports); India and Pakistan 330 million (instead of 440 million); and Japan a meager 12.5 million (instead of 90 million). No detailed

estimates are given for China or Brazil. In conclusion Stamp maintains that the present farmlands of the world can feed at least 3 billion people, and that "if the lands at present unused or inadequately used could be brought into production on the same basis, potential world population climbs to over the ten billion mark." Stamp himself refers to all these figures as "speculative conclusions," and admits many serious defects—economic, social, and geographical. But despite all deficiencies, his observations on the production potential of the temperate lands of the Western hemisphere should be a challenge to any local neo-Malthusians.

De Castro analyzes the problems in terms of human stomachs rather than acres of land, realistically describing the phenomena of hunger in nearly all parts of the world. By correlating the daily average human consumption of animal protein, like meat or milk, with the crude birth rates of different countries, he attempts to show that the lower the consumption of such proteins the higher is the birth rate. Inhabitants of Formosa, for example, have an average daily animal protein consumption of little over an eighth of an ounce, yet their birth rate is over 45 per thousand; for Italy the corresponding figures are over half an ounce and 23.4; for the United States and Sweden they are two ounces (for each) and only 17.9 and 15.0, respectively.

Despite the large table of correlations prepared by de Castro, the statistical evidence for the connection between animal-protein consumption and increase of population appears far from satisfactory. For further proof he refers to laboratory tests on the mechanism of estrogen hormones in the human body, contending that nature "speeds up reproduction when the species seems threatened with extinction" as a result of insufficient consumption of food, particularly animal proteins. The reviewer is unable to judge the validity of this statement, but general comment on the value of these laboratory tests emphasizes their inconclusive nature. In any case, overpopulation, according to de Castro, is simply the effect of hunger; once hunger is removed, the bogey of Malthusian theory ceases to exist, for then, as a result of automatic laws of nature, man will no longer outbreed his resources.

Accordingly, in the last part of his book, de Castro suggests how to remove hunger from the world. Here his specific Brazilian experience shapes his argument. He blames colonial exploitation, with its plantations and monocultures, for man's inability to organize sufficient food production, and suggests that in the future, in addition to scientific development of land resources, "products must be valued in keeping

with the needs of the producers." Since housewives all over the world are struggling with the high price of coffee today, which is regulated according to "the needs of the producers," it is extremely doubtful whether this method, even apart from its difficulties of definition, can serve to increase and redistribute food supplies. Further, as Britain and Israel are now discovering to their dismay, intensification of agricultural production generally implies a greater participation in foreign trade—a point to which both Stamp and de Castro have failed to give answers. And finally, have not Soviet Russia and other countries found that large-scale agricultural units are necessary—whether they are called plantations or collectives—in order to feed the millions that make the tools needed for efficient agriculture? Altogether de Castro's analysis and recommendations are far from satisfactory, although his thesis of the relation between hunger and population appears worthy of further thorough statistical investigation under various economic and social conditions.

ALEXANDER MELAMID

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
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